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During the 1969-70 academic year, Dr. William F. Swindler with
the assistance of the editorial staff of the William and Mary Law
Review prepared an extended research project with the coopera-
tion and assistance of The Federal Judicial Center. The purpose of
this study was to survey the present state of post-conviction pro-
cedures in each of the fifty states in view of federal and state de-
velopments of the past decade. The progress of the research was
submitted to members of the State-Federal Regulations Advisory
Committee of the Judicial Center (Tentative Drafts No. 1, No-
vember 1969; No. 2, May 1970) for review and revision. The
present publication reflects the comments received from authori-
ties in constitutional and criminal law.
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bly (11 WM. & MARY L. Riv. 1031).
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STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES AND
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
INTRODUCTION
This study was undertaken for The Federal Judicial Center and its
State-Federal Relations Advisory Committee. The objective was to sum-
marize the present posture of state post-conviction processes with refer-
ence to the substantial body of adjudication in the federal courts, the
Congressional enactments in Title 28 of the United States Code, and the
statutory revisions undertaken by certain state legislatures. Practices in
certain states with reference to post-conviction remedies which con-
sistently meet the criteria of this summary are identified in order that the
federal courts, to whom state prisoners now direct a large volume of
habeas corpus petitions, may readily determine if constitutional rights
have been adequately protected in the state forum.
I. CHRONOLOGY OF THE PROBLEM
The adequacy, or perhaps inadequacy, of post-conviction procedures
in the state courts, as pointed up by the steady increase in habeas corpus
petitions in the United States district courts by prisoners in state custody,
has created a dual problem. On the one hand, the continued growth
of habeas corpus petitions seeking review of state cases allegedly deny-
ing defendants' constitutional rights has placed additional burdens on
already over-extended federal dockets. On the other hand, the regu-
laity with which convicted persons challenge the constitutional safe-
guards in the state procedural systems has substantially complicated
the administration of criminal justice at the state level.
Consideration is also given the stresses created within the ancient
writ of habeas corpus itself, which historically was issued after the
primary inquiry into the jurisdiction of the committing court. This ac-
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cent has given way to a more recent position which emphasizes the
need for an inquiry into the intrinsic fairness of the proceedings under
which the prisoner has been convicted. Since the adoption of the Ju-
dicial Code of 1948,1 the federal courts have become increasingly more
receptive to petitions based upon allegations 'of infringement of con-
stitutional rights. The matter of jurisdiction has been all but obscured
as the writ has been broadened to cover more varied causes. 2 Finally,
there is in the post-conviction question the serious practical matter of
accommodating the situation of a federal judge acting alone ordering
the release of one who has had his conviction affirmed by the state
court of last resort, and review of this affirmance denied by the United
States Supreme Court.'
The present state of the problem has obviously resulted from the
tenor of constitutional decisions in recent years and the emphasis on
the safeguarding of individual rights. The legality of incarceration
which is thus sought to be tested by petition for habeas corpus in the
federal courts has regularly been phrased in terms of deprivation of
constitutional rights rather than of guilt or innocence of the prisoner.
Because the preservation of these rights continues to be the chief con-
cern of the federal judiciary, a broad definition of habeas corpus juris-
diction is a logical counterpart. For the states to diminish the steady
flow of appeals to the federal courts, it is essential that they develop
post-conviction procedures which will meet the constitutional tests
insisted upon.4
1. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 869. Cf. Rarker, Limiting the Abuse of
Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948); Becker, Collateral Post-Conviction Review of State
and Federal Criminal Judgments on Habeas Corpus and Section 2255 Motions-View of
a District Judge, 33 F.R.D. 452 (1963).
2. Cases reflecting the broadening of the applicability of the writ before and after
the adoption of the 1948 Judicial Code: Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (jury prej-
udice); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (coerced confessions-discrimination in
jury selection); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (denial of counsel); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (introduction of known perjured testimony by the prose-
cution); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of the trial).
3. Cf. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF ThE LAw OF FEDERAL COUarTs 183 (1963); Jacob &
Sharna, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-Correc-
tional Process, 18 KAN. L. REv. No. 3 (1970); Lay, Post-Conviction Renditions and an
Overburdened Judiciary: Solutions Ahead, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 5 (1969).
4. In addition to broadening the definition of the common law writ of habeas corpus,
some state courts have, in the alternative, allowed the revitalization of the writ of error
coram nobis in criminal cases. Generally, coram nobis is brought for an alleged error
of fact dehors the record in the same court rendering judgment of conviction. The
errors of fact must be of such fundamental character as to render the proceeding in-
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Since 1833 the federal habeas corpus act has applied to all prisoners
convicted of violations of federal law,0 and since 1867 the federal writ
has been available to state prisoners who could validly raise a constitu-
tional question under the Fourteenth Amendment." The federal courts
long refrained, however, from encouraging reliance upon the statute
out of a desire to avoid encroachment upon state courts' jurisdiction.
Because of this viewpoint they relied upon an 1886 decision holding
that state petitioners should first show that they had exhausted all state
remedies available to them."
In 1923, however, the Court accepted an argument first advanced
by Justice Holmes dissenting in a 1915 case,' that since an elemental
ingredient of due process was the right to a fair trial, habeas corpus
valid, or of such a nature as to prevent rendition of the judgment had they been known.
For illustrative materials regarding both the traditional and the more recent expansion
of the use of coram nobis, including alleged deprivation of constitutional rights see the
following: Fairfield, Post-Conviction Rights and Remedies in Wisconsin, 1965 Wis. L.
REv. 52; Harvey, 28 US.C. 2255: From Habeas Corpus to Coram Nobis, 1 WAsHBuRN
L. J. 381 (1961); Note, Coram Nobis, 4 IDAHo L. REv. 89 (1967); Note, The Expanding
Scope of Coram Nobis, 13 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 116 (1967); Comment, Post-Conviction
Remedies-The Need for Legislative Change, 55 GEo. LJ. 851 (1967); Note, State Post-
Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 154 (1965); 38 N.D.
L. REv. 522 (1962). See the following for individual state discussions: Cal., Note, Review
of Criminal Convictions by Habeas Corpus in California, 15 HASTINGS LJ. 189 (1963);
Colo, Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus Confronts the Colorado Courts: Catalyst or Cata-
clysm?, 39 U. CoLO. L. Rev. 83 (1966); Ga, Brown, Federalism and Federal Habeas Corpus
-What Impact on Georgia Criminal Law and Procedure?, 16 MERcER L. REv. 281 (1964);
Idaho, Note, Habeas Corpus in Idaho, 4 IDAHo L. REv. 45 (1967); Ind, Note, Habeas
Corpus and Coram Nobis in Indiana, 26 IND. LJ. 529 (1951); Iowa, Note, The Need for
an Iowa Post-Conviction Hearing Statute, 18 DRaKE L. REv. 98 (1968); Kan., Note,
Post-Conviction Motions Under the Kansas Revised Code of Civil Procedure, 12 KAN.
L. REv. 493 (1964); Md., Markell, Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas
Corpus and by Appeal, 101 U. PA. L. Rev. 1154 (1953); N.Y., Cohen, Post-Conviction
Relief in the New York Court of Appeals: New Wine and Broken Bottles, 35 BaooKYvN
L. Rev. 1 (1968); Pa, Note, Habeas Corpus and the 1966 Post-Conviction Hearing Act:
Major Pennsylvania Remedies in Criminal Cases, 39 TEMPLE L.Q. 188 (1966); Note,
Habeas Corpus in Pennsylvania After Conviction, 20 U. Prrr. L. REv. 652 (1959); W.
Va., Note, Habeas Corpus in West Virginia, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 293 (1967).
5. Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632.
6. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Star. 385.
7. Ex parte Royal, 117 US. 241 (1886). This case implied that the state petitioner
for a federal writ of habeas corpus should exhaust state remedies by holding that (a)
a United States Circuit Court had the power to remove the petitioner from state juris-
diction before trial, and (b) the Circuit Court retained a discretion to put the accused
to his appeal by writ of error from the highest state court or to proceed under habeas
corpus to examine alleged violations of constitutional rights.
8. Frank v. Mangum, 237 US. 309 (1915).
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could issue to test an allegation of denial of that right. Fifteen years
later, the Court warned the states that they were chargeable with afford-
ing prisoners a reasonable means of raising their claims of denial of
federal rights and that, therefore, there should be a post-conviction
remedy which would accommodate the general due process principles
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 Where this involved a habeas corpus
proceeding which required some consideration of the jurisdiction of
the original court, it soon became manifest that an inordinate amount
of legal fiction would be involved. In 1942 the Court candidly stated
that habeas corpus "extends also to those exceptional cases where the
conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
rights." 'I The Court was merely underlining the basic two part prob-
lem which was emerging: The need for a reviewing procedure better
adapted to the protection of rights than habeas corpus, and the need
for such procedure to be developed and administered within the state
courts not the federal court system. Seeking to encourage the states to
assume this responsibility, the Court in 1944 undertook to limit its 1942
decision in Waley v. Johnston by declaring, in Ex Parte Hawke, 2 that
the petitioner had to exhaust his post-conviction remedies under state
law before habeas corpus relief could be obtained in the federal courts.
The opinion recognized, however, that this did little to resolve the basic
problem; for once it could be shown, as it could more often than not,
9. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
10. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1938).
11. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942).
12. 321 U.S. 114 (1944). This decision resulted in the following rules governing habeas
corpus petitions to federal courts: (a) such petitions would be entertained by a federal
court (for one convicted and detained by the state) only where all state remedies, in-
cluding all state appellate remedies and appeal or certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, had been exhausted; (b) the principle cited previously that the interference by
the federal judiciary with state decisions will only take place in "rare cases" where ex-
ceptional circumstances of "peculiar urgency" are shown to exist is applicable where
the petitioner had not exhausted state remedies but is inapplicable where petitioner had
exhausted state remedies and makes a substantial showing of a denial of federal rights;
(c) where state courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of the petition and
the United States Supreme Court has reviewed or declined to review the state court
decision, the federal courts will not ordinarily reexamine on writ of habeas corpus;
(d) federal courts should entertain a petition for habeas corpus where resort to state
remedies failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions therein
raised either because no remedy is available or the remedy provided proves in practice
to be unavailable or seriously inadequate.
[Vol. 12:147
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that state post-conviction remedies were lacking or inadequate, the pe-
titioner would still pursue a course into the federal courts.
It was against this background, that Congress drafted the Judicial
Code of 1948, which undertook to codify the judicial preference for
a reliance upon state remedies. Congress contemplated no material
change in existing practice but sought in its codification to emphasize
the discretion of the circuit or district judge to deny "nuisance" appli-
cations which, because of their repetitious and unfounded nature, im-
posed an unnecessary burden on the courts.13 In what is now 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244, the statute directed that federal courts need not entertain a
habeas petition if the legality of the state detention had been determined
in any prior federal adjudication.14 However, accepting the realities of
contemporary criminal procedure in most states, section 2254 was added
in the same act, providing:
An application for writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the reme-
dies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an
absence of available State corrective process or the existence of
circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this sec-
tion, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented.15
By this enactment, Congress sought to alert the states to the specific
criteria by which removals by habeas corpus to the federal courts could
13. See legislative history following 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964); Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d
857, 862 (1945).
14. No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for
a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant
to a judgment of a court of the United States, or of any State, if it appears
that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court
of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and
the petition presents no new ground not theretofore presented and deter-
mined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not
be served by such inquiry.
28 U.S.C. § 2244.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) (emphasis added). The legislative history of this section
indicates a desire to retain the existing practice affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); cf. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong, 1st
Sess. (1947).
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be minimized. As if further to illustrate the method of drafting suit-
able statutory procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 set out the federal statutory
procedure to be followed with respect to persons in federal custody:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or that the court was 'without jurisdiction
to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case con-
clusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court
shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States at-
torney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and
make findings of fact and conclusions of law 'with respect thereto.
If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without juris-
diction, or that' the sentence imposed was not authorized by law
or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such
a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner
as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court
shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the pris-
oner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence
as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without re-
quiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second
or successive motion for similar relief'on behalf of the same pris-
oner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order
entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for
a writ of habeas corpus.
An application for a 'writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a pris-
oner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to
this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant
has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sen-
tenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of his detention.10
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 12:147
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Thus section 2255 accomplished for federal criminal procedure what
section 2254 could only urge upon the states in terms of state criminal
procedure. It provided a modern statutory means to serve the purposes
embodied in the ancient common law writ of error coram nobis, and
in the same process made largely unnecessary a resort to habeas corpus
by federal prisoners.17 It is clear that more than two decades ago Con-
gress, in the first two paragraphs of section 2255, gave the states explicit
guidelines for keeping their prisoners within the jurisdiction of their
own courts. But the fundamental flaw in the Congressional effort was
still the lethargy in state statutory revision. The Court recognized as
much in the 1949 case of Young v. Ragen, I where it warned that, al-
though federal courts should deny habeas corpus relief until all state
remedies had been exhausted, such a rule presupposed that adequate
remedies exist in fact within the state criminal process.
Continuing to give the states every opportunity to put their houses
in order, in 1950 the Court in Darr vu. Burford 9 struggled to postpone
the stage of federal entry by declaring that part of the exhaustion proc-
cess was a petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari in cases of state
denials of relief. Three years later this rule was repeated in Bro'wn v.
Allen"° which declared that a denial of certiorari by the United States
17. See legislative history following 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964); cf. H.R. REP. No. 308,
supra note 15.
18. 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
Of course we do not review state decisions which rest upon adequate non-
federal grounds, and of course Illinois may choose the procedure it deems
appropriate for the vindication of federal rights .... But it is not simply a
question of state procedure when a state court of last resort closes the door
to any consideration of a claim of denial of a federal right.
Id. at 238.
19. 339 U.S. 200, 216 (1950). "Though our denial of certiorari carry no weight in
a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, we think a petition for certiorari should
nevertheless be made before an application may be filled in another federal court by
a state prisoner." The Court in this case was most concerned with the comity doctrine
and, as the dissent pointed out, unnecessarily burdened itself because of the absence
of a res judicata effect on habeas corpus. For an article aareeing with the dissent see
Comment, Habeas Corpus-Exhaustion of State Remedies-Denial of Certiorari by Su-
preme Court as Condition to Obtaining Original Writ in Federal District Court, 49
MicH. L. REv. 611 (1951); see also 3 ALA. L. REv. 212 (1950); 50 COLuM. L. REv. 856
(1950).
20. 344 U.S. 443, 489-497 (1953). The reliance that a district court should place on
the review or denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court was ultimately spelled out in
the 1966 amendment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1966). For discussion of the case see Howe,
The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HAv. L. REv. 91, 156-60 (1953) (generally agreeing
with the decision); 21 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 810 (1953) (supporting the interest of the
1970]
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Supreme Court to review a decision of a state supreme court which had
affirmed a conviction in a criminal prosecution should be given no
weight by a federal court in passing upon the petitioner's application
for a writ of habeas corpus. This position was reached by recognizing
that in many cases where certiorari had been denied no hearing on the
merits of the issues raised in the petition had taken place. The ultimate
result of these holdings was simply to render artificial and superfluous
the resort to the Supreme Court as part of the exhaustion process.21
By 1953, the states were slowly beginning to attempt responses to
the proddings of both Congress and the federal judiciary. In that year
a special committee on habeas corpus of the Conference of State Chief
Justices conceded that many of the complexities created by the growing
reliance on federal habeas corpus could be resolved by state law re-
form.an Two years later, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws completed work on a Uniform Post-Convic-
tion Procedure Act, which was intended to simplify and standardize
state post-conviction remedies in order to conform with the federal
standards. The National Conference was reminded that the "multiplicity
of remedies at the state level, coupled with the inconsistencies and in-
definiteness of these remedies, have made the prerequisite of exhausting
the state remedies costly, time-consuming, and uncertain. The ideal
situation is to have one remedy which supersedes and includes all other
common law and statutory remedies." 23 Perhaps the most important
feature of this act provided that the order in the state court making
final disposition of the petition should clearly state the grounds on
which the case was determined and whether a federal or state right was
decided. Conceivably, had this recordation provision been adopted by
all the states, the job of the federal courts in sorting out unmeritorious
claims in habeas petitions would have been materially eased.
In the absence of any concerted reform movement in the states (only
four states, in fact, adopted the 1955 Uniform Act), the federal courts
petitioner over the interest of comity); 39 VA. L. REv. 381 (1953) (agreeing with the
decision but expressing a fear that the district courts will continue to place reliance
on the denial of certiorari nonetheless).
21. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963).
22. Cf. PRocEriNGs, CoNFERENcE oF CHiEF JuTsncEs 1-11 (1953).
23. Prefatory Note, 9B UNanom LAws AwNoT. 548 (1966).
24. Cf. UNwoR Posr-CoNveInoN PRocEDuRE Acr § 7 (1955).
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necessarily remained in the picture. The next significant development
was the "trilogy" of cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1963: Fay
v. Noia,25 Townsend v. Sain,0 and Sanders v. United States.2 7
In Fay v. Noia the Court held that the jurisdiction of the federal
courts in regard to habeas corpus-is not affected by procedural defaults
incurred by the applicant during the state court proceedings. Thus,
the Court clarified its previous doctrine of exhausting every state reme-
dy by declaring that section 2254 refers only to a failure to exhaust
state remedies still open to the petitioner at the time he files his petition
for habeas corpus in the federal court. The opinion also stressed that
the district court may deny relief in its discretion to a petitioner who
had deliberately avoided the procedure of the state law and had thereby
waived his claims under post-conviction review. But where, as was
generally the case, the question was not one of avoiding procedure but
of seeking to have constitutional rights properly considered on review,
the net effect of the holding was to assure that the district court would
in fact hear the petitions. 8
Of significance in Townsend v. Sain was the Court's firm statement
of the necessity of a proper record of evidentiary hearings at the state
level.29 The district court is obliged to hear the petitions where
25. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
26. 372 US. 293 (1963).
27. 373 US. 1 (1963).
28. 372 U.S. at 434 et seq. Fay v. Noia set out the guiding principle that conventional
notions of finality in criminal litigation could not be permitted to defeat the federal
policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty should not be denied with-
out the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judiciary review. Id. at 424. See Gold &
Emerling, Federal Habeas Corpus for the State Prisoner-A New Look, 25 Orno SL.J. 60
(1964) (a discussion in support of the Supreme Court decision but raising doubts as
to the degree to which the holding would liberalize the rules of habeas corpus eligibility);
Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedure, 52 VA. L. REv.
286 (1966) (which sees Noia as carving out a new role as activist for the state trial
judge to protect the resulting conviction finality by showing in the record that the peti-
tioner deliberately bypassed state procedure and that no constitutional questions are left
unraised at the trial level). The Meador article suggests that the influence the Noia and
Townsend cases have had in bringing on reform in state post-conviction review could
significantly improve the quality of criminal justice, although it predicts a federal court
retrenchment on the Noia tests of forfeiture and deliberate by-pass. Note, The 1963
Trilogy, 42 N.C. L. REv. 352 (1964) is an excellent summary of the law presented
in Noia, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) and Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1
(1963). See also comments in 76 HARv. L. Rav. 416 (1962); 62 CoLum. L. REv. 1077
(1962); 48 VA. L. REV. (1962).
29. 372 US. at 312 et seq. This requirement of Townsend has been expanded and
incorporated into 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1964) by the 1966 amendment to this section. Act
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(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported
by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed
by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hear-
ing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evi-
dence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the
state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state
trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact
hearing.30
Thus, the Court expanded the scope of relief in federal habeas corpus
situations where the demands of due process and the inadequacy of
state post-conviction remedies make it necessary.
Although the Sanders case was not a proceeding in habeas corpus but
a section 2255 motion, it was evident from the opinion and subsequent
judicial behavior that it was to be analogized to section 2254 petitions.
The case concerned the vexing problem of repetitious motions by fed-
eral prisoners for post-conviction relief. The Court took the oppor-
tunity afforded by Sanders to fix a reasonable limit to habeas corpus
petitions and section 2255 motions by declaring that to merit a hearing
in the district court, the grounds asserted must be different from those
on which prior applications had been denied.31
The effect of the "trilogy," nevertheless, was to increase federal
habeas corpus business in the face of an already overburdened federal
docket. Under the circumstances of the state post-conviction procedures
then existing, it was reasonable to anticipate that almost any well-drafted
petition alleging one or more of the grounds set out in Townisend
would succeed in obtaining a hearing.
Seeking to accelerate state reform, and at the same time adapt to the
new guidelines of the "trilogy," the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws prepared the Revised Uniform Post-
of November 2, 1966, § 2, 80 Star. 1105. For law review comment on the Townsend
decision see, Gold & Emerling, supra note 28; Meador, supra note 28; Note, The 1963
Trilogy, 42 N.C. L. REv. 352 (1964); Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus: Its Increasing
Influence on State Criminal Procedure, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 335 (1965) (suggesting the
impact of Townsend to be that a state prisoner will get a hearing somewhere unless he
has deliberately bypassed state procedure or deliberately waived state remedies, but raising
doubts that the Supreme Court has succeeded in clarifying and simplifying the question
of federal habeas corpus).
30. 372 US. at 312-18.
31. 373 U.S. at 17-20.
[Vol. 12:147
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Conviction Procedure Act of 1965.32 The basic objectives of this act
were similar to those of the 1955 act. The significance of the changes
as well as the accommodation of the criteria in the "trilogy," are discern-
ible in Part V, infra. The number of state adoptions is small-two, in ad-
dition to the four which had adopted and have subsequently amended
the 1955 model-but hopefully will increase in the legislative sessions
of the early seventies. In any event, this is not to say that only a
model law will establish a post-conviction reviewing process which will
be acceptable in the district courts. Most post-1963 amendments to
existing state laws on the subject presumably were enacted in an effort
to come to terms with the "trilogy." In this connection, see Table 2
in Part II and the specific developments in Part IV, infra.
This condensed chronological description of the emergence of prob-
lems of state post-conviction remedies vis-a-vis federal habeas corpus
provides a background for analysis of the problems which follow. Part
II incorporates statistics illustrating the growth of the problem in
federal-state judicial relationships, and tabulates the tentative correla-
tion between federal decisions and state legislative responses. Part III
is a recapitulation of the guidelines evolved to date as a result of the
"trilogy" and its effect on the 1965 revision of the Post-Conviction Pro-
cedure Act. Part IV considers the efforts to modernize the post-convic-
tion process in a dozen selected states. 33 A summary of the situation in
the remaining states is provided in the same section.
On the basis of this data, Part V deals with the "scale of adequacy"
and its implementation in state-by-state situations.
II. STATISTICS OF THE PROBLEM: FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS, 1962-1968
These statistics seek to document the answers to two questions aris-
ing from the foregoing chronology: (1) Has the checklist of minimal
requirements set out in the "trilogy" stimulated greater reliance on fed-
eral habeas corpus? (2) Has any revision in post-conviction procedure
in any of the states since the 1963 "trilogy" resulted either in a signifi-
cant drop in federal habeas or a significant increase in terminations be-
fore pretrial in the federal courts? The statistics collected for the
32. The full text of the Revised Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1965 is
reprinted in Part III infra.
33. California, Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia.
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years 1962, 1964, 1966, and 1968 from the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts have been grouped by circuits in Table 1.
TABLE I
STATE HABEAS CORPUS TERmiNATIONs BY ACTION TAxEN BY U. S. DISTRICT COURTS
TABLE 1-A
Totals for All Federal District Courts
Total No Court Total Before Total
Year Petitions Action Action Pretrial Pretrials Trials
1962 1,126 31 1,095 1,033 2 60
1964 3,535 41 3,494 3,247 17 230*
1966 4,760 74 4,686 4,207 45 434*
1968 6,046 68 5,978 5,416 78 484
*One tried with jury.
TABLE 1-B
Totals for District of Columbia Circuit
Total No Court Total Before
Date Petitions Action Action Pretrial Pretrials Trials
1962 2 2 2
1964 1 1
1966 1 1 1
1968 5 5 4 1
TABLE 1-C
Totals for First Circuit
No
District Date Total Court Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
1962 5
1964 1
1966 7
1968 10
1962 2
1964 10
1966 21
1968 44
1962
1964
1966
1968
1 1 1
4 4 3
51
7
10
2
10
1 20
2 42
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TABLE 1-c--Continued
No
District Date Total Court Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
Rhode Island 1962
1964 2 1 1 1
1966
1968 2 1 1 1
Puerto Rico 1962 3 1 2 2
1964 11 1 10 9 1
1966 39 2 37 32 5
1968 15 15 13 1 1
TABLE 1-D
Totals for Second Circuit
Connecticut 1962 33 4 29 29
1964 43 43 37 6
1966 51 1 50 37 2 11
1968 38 3, 35 30 5
New York 1962 73 73 70 3(northern) 1964 276 3 274 264 10"
1966 128 128 119 9
1968 95 95 92 3
1962 2 1 1 1
(eastern) 1964 11 1 10 10
1966 16 2 14 13 1.,
1968 123 1 122 115 7"
1962 34 5 29 28 1
(southern) 1964 209 2 207 207
1966 201 7 194 194
1968 230 3 227 225 1 i
1962 101 1 100 100
(western) 1964 220 1 219 215 4
1966 127 2 125 125.
1968 92 1 91 89 2
Vermont 1962 2 2 1 1
1964 1 1 1
1966
1968 1 1 1
TABLE I-E
Totals for Third Circuit
Delaware 1962 5
1964 4
1966 14
1968 16
4
2 12
1 15
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TABLE 1- -- Continued
No
District Date Total Court Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
New Jersey 1962 25 1 24 22 2
1964 55 55 53 2
1966 75 75 71 4
1968 99 99 96 3
Pennsylvania 1962 44 44 40 4
(eastern) 1964 120 2 118 106 12
1966 130 2 128 105 23
1968 209 209 138 31
1962 22 2 20 20
(middle) 1964 47 47 42 5
1966 99 1 98 85 13
1968 56 56 55 1
1962 14 2 12 7 5
(western) 1964 17 17 13 4
1966 159 1 158 154 4
1968 121 1 120 115 5
TABLE 1-F
Totals for Fourth Circuit
Maryland
North Carolina
(eastern)
(middle)
(western)
South Carolina
(eastern)
(western)
Virginia
(eastern)
1962 54
1964 279
1966 186
1968 187
1962 14
1964 52
1966 91
1968 60
1962 1
1964 4
1966 22
1968 44
1962
1964 10
1966 78
1968 73
1962 4
1964 27
1966 16
1968 41
1962 2
1964 2
1966
1968
1962 43
1964 158
1966 209
1968 392
14
1 51
91
60
1
4
22
1 43
11
22
18
1 9
1
3
5
6
4
10 10
2 76 64
2 71 66
4 4
27 22
16 16
41 39
2 2
2 2
6
2 9
8 27
10 18
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TABLE 1oF-Continued
No
District Date Total Court Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
Virginia 1962 1 1 1
(western) 1964 1 1 1
1966 4 4 4
1968 150 150 140 2 8
West Virginia 1962 37 37 33 4
(northern) 1964 81 81 69 12
1966 215 5 210 189 21
1968 72 1 71 42 29
1962
(southern) 1964 1 1 1
1966 3 1 2 2
1968 22 2 20 18 2
TABLE 1-G
Totals for Fifth Circuit
Alabama(northern)
(middle)
(southern)
Florida
(northern)
(middle)
(southern)
Georgia
(northern)
1962 5
1964 10
1966 12
1968 16
1962 7
1964 87
1966 123
1968 86
1962 1
1964 7
1966 28
1968 51
1962
1964 5
1966 22
1968 60
1962
1964 35
1966 137
1968 181
1962 12
1964 5
1966 10
1968 110
1962 1
1964 7
1966 22
1968 51
5
10
12
16
7
87
2 121
86
1
2 5
28
4 47
5
22
1 59
12
13
3 3
1
6
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TABLE 1-G-Continued
No
District Date Total Court Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
Georgia 1962
(middle) 1964 3 3 3
1966 15 3 12 11 1
1968 30 30 29 1
1962 9 9 9
(southern) 1964 68 68 67 1
1966 77 77 34 43
1968 130 1 129 92 37
Louisiana 1962 7 7 7
(eastern) 1964 49 1 48 48
1966 47 47 43 4
1968 68 3 65 44 21
1962
(western) 1964 3 3 3
1966 14 14 10 4
1968 12 12 6 1 5
Mississippi 1962
(northern) 1964 1 1 1
1966 5 5 4 1
1968 11 11 11
1962(southern) 1964 8 1 7 6 1
1966 4 4 2 -2
1968 6 6 4 2
Texas 1962 2 2 2
(northern) 1964 9 9 7 2
1966 14 14 12 2
1968 128 4 124 96 17 11
1962 5 5 4 1(eastern) 1964 18 18 17 1
1966 55 55 38 17
1968 39 39 34 5
1962 20 2 18 16 2
(southern) 1964 71 3 68 62 6
1966 179 4 175 133 42
1968 194 7 187 159 5 23
1962 3 3 2 1
(western) 1964 3 3 3
1966 11 11 11
1968 49 2 47 43 4
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TABLE 1-H
Totals for Sixth Circuit
No
District Date Total Court Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
Kentucky 1962
(eastern) 1964
1966 1 1 1
1968 18 18 18
1962 9 9 8 1
(western) 1964 19 19 18 1
1966 44 44 44
1968 38 38 37 1
Michigan 1962 45 2 43 43
(eastern) 1964 71 1 70 66 1 3
1966 54 4 50 48 2
1968 86 86 85 1
1962 2 2 1 1
(western) 1964 7 1 6 6
1966 6 6 6
1968 39 2 37 32 1 4
Ohio 1962 2 2 2
(northern) 1964 6 6 6
1966 43 43 42 1
1968 59 59 56 3
1962 10 10 10
(southern) 1964 73 2 71 52 1 18
1966 42 3 39 33 6
1968 84 2 82 72 2 8
Tennessee 1962 1 1 1
(eastern) 1964 14 14 14
1966 22 1 21 19 2
1968 40 40 37 3
1962 22 22 20 2
(middle) 1964 70 5 65 54 11
1966 136 2 134 107 27
1968 92 2 80 78 12
1962
(western) 1964 2 2 2
1966 12 12 12
1968 32 1 31 26 5
TABLE 1-I
Totals for Seventh Circuit
Illinois 1962 76 3 73 72 1
(northern) 1964 197 3 194 189 5
1966 132 3 129 127 2
1968 192 2 190 189 1
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TABLE 1-I-Continued
NoDistrict Date Total Court Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
Illinois
(eastern)
(southern)
Indiana
(northern)
(southern)
Wisconsin
(eastern)
(western)
1962 35
1964 53
1966 52
1968 46
1962 3
1964 2
1966 4
1968 1
1962 24
1964 32
1966 23
1968 46
1962 5
1964 5
1966 15
1968 18
1962 6
1964 29
1966 29
1968 69
1962
1964
1966
1968 23
1 34
53
52
45
3
2
4
1
24
32
23
46
5
5
3 12
18
6
29
29
69
23 23
TABLE 1-~J
Totals for Eighth Circuit
Arkansas
(eastern)
(Oestern)
Iowa
(northern)
(southern)
1962 2
1964 5
1966 18
1968 29
1962
1964 1
1966 1
1968 4
1962
1964 1
1966 4
1968 8
1962 10
1964 31
1966 9
1968 8
2
5
18
28
1
I
4
I
4
8
9
31
9
8
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TABLE 1-J-Continued
No
District Date Total Court Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
Minnesota
Missouri
(eastern)
(western)
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
5
2 38
23
20
6
2
2 13
23
58
1 31
59
19
37
15
27
1
2
3
1
2
1 3
1
21 1
3
1
9
TABLE 1-3r
Totals for Ninth Circuit
Alaska 1962 1
1964
1966 8
1968 8
Arizona
California
(northern)
(eastern)
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968 289 289 286
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TABLE 1-x---Continued
No
District Date Total Court' Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
Cal
c
Hai
Ida
Mot
ifornia 1962
central) 1964
1966
1968 263
1962 13
southern) 1964 94
1966 190
1968 26
waii 1962
1964 2
1966 3
1968 2
ho 1962 1
1964 1
1966 4
1968 4
ntana 1962 1
1964 21
1966 18
1968 9
vada 1962 3
1964 7
1966 21
1968 32
gon 1962 21
1964 45
1966 23
1968 43
shington 1962 20
(eastern) 1964 39
1966 53
1968 24
1962 2
(western) 1964 20
1966 16
1968 16
1
2
5
1 31 3
3 19
1
4 8
7 8
1
21
18
9
3
7
1 20
42
21
45
23
1 42
20
39
2 51
24
2
20
16
16'
Nei
Ore
Wa
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TABL. 1-L
Totals for Tenth Circuit
No
District Date Total Court Total Before Pretrials Trials
Petitions Action Action Pretrial
Colorado
Kansas
New Mexico
Oklahoma
(northern)
(eastern)
(western)
Utah
Wyoming
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
1962
1964
1966
1968
41
105
1 119
94
4
24
5 121
1 82
13 10
4 1
6
40 36
53 43
1 1
3 3
5 5
21 16
1 12 12
13 11
16 15
1 39 38
3 3
1 1
2 1
3 3
6
3
19
4
2 31
9
8
1
5
21 52
25 30
3
3
6
4
10
5
1
1
1
1"
For those states which have made substantive changes in their post-
conviction procedure since 1963, the pertinent statistics from the first set
of tables have been set out with the dates and data from the pertinent
states in Table 2. Extensive research in the individual circuits will be
required to determine the disposition of the petitions indicated below,
both as to terminations and trials. Until such research can be completed,
these statistics merely provide information on volume and indicate points
of greatest pressure on the federal courts.
1970]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
TABLE 2
STATUTORY AND RULE REVISION IN THE STATES
AND FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
In the following table, the second column gives the date of any statutory or rule
change on post-conviction remedies in the past decade; if the column is blank present
information indicates no revision within this time period. The data reflecting the num-
bers of habeas corpus petitions for the respective years has been extrapolated from data
in Table 1.
Effective Date Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions
Name of State of Revision 1962 1964 1966 1968
Alabama 13 104 163 153
Alaska 1968 1 8 8
Arizona 5 19 45 36
Arkansas 1965; 1967 2 6 19 33
California 98 358 808 1,015
Colorado 1963; 1965 11 75 66 57
Connecticut 33 43 51 38
Delaware 1969 5 4 14 16
Florida 1963; 1968 12 45 169 351
Georgia 1967 10 78 114 211
Hawaii 2 3 2
Idaho 1967 1 1 4 4
Illinois 1963; 1965 114 252 188 239
Indiana 1969 29 37 38 64
Iowa 10 35 13 16
Kansas 1964 41 105 120 94
Kentucky 1965 9 19 45 56
Louisiana 1967 7 52 61 80
Maine 1963 5 1 7 10
Maryland 1959; 1965 54 279 186 187
Massachusetts 2 10 21 44
Michigan 1963 47 78 60 125
Minnesota 1967; 1969 5 40 23 20
Mississippi 1966 9 9 17
Missouri 1967 23 64 34 74
Montana 1967 1 21 18 9
Nebraska 1965; 1967 19 37 15 27
Nevada 1967 3 7 21 42
New Hampshire 1 1 4
New Jersey 1964; 1969 25 55 75 99
New Mexico 1966 4 24 126 83
New York 210 716 472 540
North Carolina 1968 15 66 191 177
North Dakota 1969 1 2 3
Ohio 1965; 1967 12 79 85 143
Oklahoma 1965; 1969 5 9 45 87
Oregon 1959 21 45 23 43
Pennsylvania 1966; 1968 80 184 388 386
Rhode Island 2 2
South Carolina 1969 29 16 41
South Dakota 1966 1 2 4
Tennessee 1967 25 86 170 164
Texas 1967 30 101 259 410
Utah 1969 13 13 16 40
Vermont 1966 2 1 1
Virginia 44 159 213 542
Washington 22 59 69 40
West Virginia 1967 37 82 218 94
Wisconsin 6 29 29 92
Wyoming 1961; 1969 3 1 2 3
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Correlation: The "Trilogy" and Post-1963 State Laws
Has the "trilogy" had any accelerating effect upon revision of state
post-conviction procedure? Or more importantly, has there been any
significant decline in federal habeas corpus activity since such revision?
In most cases, as shown in data recapitulated in Part IV below, it is
too early to make firm statements in answer to these questions. For
either the state action has been too recent, or the necessary details from
correspondents within the states has been insufficient. Nevertheless, at
this point it may be useful to correlate the dates of state action in regard
to post-conviction procedures (with emphasis on post-1963) with the
volume of federal business indicated in the foregoing tables.
III. RECAPITULATION: THE FEDERAL "SCALE OF ADEQUACY"
The "trilogy" of 1963 cases, to a degree, represented a judicial re-
statement of the legislative propositions set out in the Judiciary Act of
1948. They may also be said to represent the ultimate extreme to which
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees have been carried along a course
begun with the revised habeas corpus act of 1867,"' and the landmark
argument by Justice Holmes in Moore v. Dempsey in 1923.1 A century
of development has now established the following: (1) the right to a
fair trial, essential to due process, and the reviewability of the question
of fairness is a constitutionally and federally guaranteed right; (2) the
-Congress and the federal courts, through the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended in 1966, and the sequence of cases culminating in the 1963
"trilogy," have laid down explicit criteria constituting a "scale of ade-
quacy" by which state post-conviction procedures may be evaluated;
and (3) the viability of state procedures depends upon the degree to
which they accommodate the fundamental requirements in the "scale
of adequacy."
These requirements may accordingly be recapitulated in terms of
(1) the specific provisions in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254 and 2255; (2) the
ten basic propositions set out in the "trilogy"; and (3) the purported
accommodation of the federal requirements in the revised Model Post-
Conviction Procedure Act of 1965.
34. Supra note 6.
35. 261 U.S. 86, 87-92 (1923).
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1. The Requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, 2255
§ 2244. Finality of determination.
(a) No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the deten-
tion of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United
States if it appears that the legality of such detention has been de-
termined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no new
ground not heretofore presented and determined, and the judge
or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by
such inquiry.
(b) When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a mate-
rial factual issue or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law,
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has
been denied by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of
the United States released from custody or other remedy on an ap-
plication for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for
a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be enter-
tained by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the
United States unless the application alleges and is predicated on a
factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the
earlier application for the writ and unless the court, justice, or
judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier applica-
tion deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise
abused the writ.
(c) In a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a prior judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of the United States on an appeal or
review by a writ of certiorari at the instance of the prisoner of
the decision of such State courts shall be conclusive as to all issues
of fact or law with respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right
which constitutes ground for discharge in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing, actually adjudicated by the Supreme Court therein, unless the
applicant for the writ of habeas corpus shall plead and the court
shall find the existence of a material and controlling fact which
did not appear in the record of the proceeding in the Supreme
Court and the court shall further find that the applicant for the
writ of habeas corpus could not have caused such fact to appear in
such record by the exercise of reasonable diligence. (As amended
Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-711, § 1, 80 Stat. 1104.)86
36. As amended by Act of November 2, 1966, § 1, 80 Stat. 1104, section 2244(a) re-
mains essentially the same as originally enacted, dropping its reference to state deten-
[Vol. 12:,147
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The following extract illustrates the necessity to finalize criminal judg-
ments and relieve the pressure on the district courts:
petitions for the writ are used not only as they should be, to
protect unfortunate persons against miscarriages of justice, but
also as a device for harassing court, custodial and enforcement
officers with a multiplicity of repetitious, meritless requests for
relief. The most extreme example is that of a person who, be-
tween July 1, 1939 and April 1944 presented in the District Court
50 petitions for writs of habeas corpus .... 37
§ 2254. State custody; remedies in Federal courts.
(a) The Supreme Court, 2 Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas cor-
pus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in viola-
tion of the constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is
either an absence of available State corrective process or the ex-
istence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to pro-
tect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of
this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise,
by any available procedure, the question presented.
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an ap-
plication for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pur-
suant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a
hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of
competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for
tion and applying exclusively to federal detention. Section 2244(b) broadens federal
court discretion in denying a writ of habeas corpus in which the applicant, on the earlier
petition, deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
Section 2244(c) is a new section designed to codify the res judicata effect of review
by appeal or certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Since exhaustion of state
remedies no longer requires the act of applying for certiorari, this section would tend
to put the petitioner to a choice of forums and may play a part in the strategy of de-
fense counsel-a not altogether desirable effect. See Note, 45 Tax. L. Rav. 592, 594-595
(1967) for a discussion of this new section.
37. H.R. REP. No. 308, supra note 15.
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the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties,
evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable
and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct,
unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or,
the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in
the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court
was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at
the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter
or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in
deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel
to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate
hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law
in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceed-
ing in which the determination of such factual issue was made,
pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support such factual determination, is produced as provided for
hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part
of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination
is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal
court, when due proof of such factual determination has been
made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances re-
spectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive,
is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by
the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the pro-
visions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State
court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support
such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant
to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination
by the State court was erroneous.
(e) If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced in such State court proceeding to support the State court's
determination of a factual issue made therein, the applicant, if
[Vol. 12:147
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able, shall produce that part of the record pertinent to a deter-
mination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such deter-
mination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is
unable to produce such part of the record, then the State shall
produce such part of the record and the Federal court shall direct
the State to do so by order directed to an appropriate State official.
If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of the record,
then the court shall determine under the existing facts and cir-
cumstances what weight shall be given to the State court's factual
determination.
(f) A copy of the official records of the State court, duly cer-
tified by the clerk of such court to be a true and correct copy of
a finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable written indicia show-
ing such a factual determination by the State court shall be admis-
sible in the Federal court proceeding. (As amended Nov. 2, 1966,
Pub. L. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1105.)38
This section pertaining to when a person in custody pursuant to a
state court judgment shall be granted an application for writ of habeas
corpus was enacted for the purpose of codifying existing habeas corpus
practice and is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme
Court.2
9
Section 2255 provides that to seek federal habeas corpus, in the case
of federal prisoners, petitioner must show a violation of a constitutional
right, lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or unreasonableness
of the sentence. Any motion to vacate a sentence must be made in the
court which imposed the sentence. Unless the motion and the files and
records of the case conclusively rebut the presumption of relief, the
court promptly serves notice on the United States attorney, grants a
prompt hearing on the motion and makes findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law thereon. If the court determines that the claims are meri-
38. Section 2254 was amended in 1966 to conform to the standards expressed
in Noia and Townsend in 1963. Subsection (a) is new, restricting the entertainment of
an application for a writ of habeas corpus to the sole ground that the petitioner is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Sub-
section (b) and (c) are the same as the original section 2254. The "available procedure"
set forth in subsection (c) was modified in Noia to mean presently available unless
deliberately bypassing normal appellate procedure. Subsection (d) incorporates and
expands the criterion set forth in Townsend raising a rebuttable presumption that
the factual determinations by a state court are correct. New subsection (e) delineates
responsibility for production of the record between the state and the petitioner and
provides for indigency. See Note, 45 Txx. L. Rev. 592, 595-598 (1967).
89. Irwin v, Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959).
1970]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
torious, it shall then vacate the sentence, resentence or grant 'a new trial.
Where the state rule governing motions to vacate a sentence was pat-
terned after this section, interpretation of the section by federal courts
is persuasive of the meaning of the state'rule. °
2. The Ten Criteria of the "Trilogy"
(1) Under section 2254 a state prisoner is required only to exhaust
those state remedies which are still open to him at the time he seeks
relief in a district court. Noia expressly excluded the necessity of
applying for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court as a prerequisite to exhaustion of state remedies.
... [O]ur decision affects all procedural hurdles to the achieve-
ment of swift and imperative justice on habeas corpus, and be-
cause the hurdle erected by Darr v. Burford is unjustifiable
under the principles we have expressed, even insofar as it may
be deemed merely an aspect of the statutory requirement of
present exhaustion, that decision in that respect is . . . over-
ruled.41
(2) Failure to appeal at any earlier date is not a waiver of right unless
intelligently and understandingly made. Waiver by petitioner is
not to be inferred from the strategy or actions of counsel unless
intelligently and understandingly ratified. Waiver of a federal
right is a reviewable question for a federal court. ". . . [T]he
federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant
who has deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state
courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies." 4
A federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas corpus
applicant under the following circumstances:
(3) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved at the state"
hearing;43
(4) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record
as a whole;"
40. State v. Gibby, 78 N.M. 414, 432 P.2d 258 (1967).
41. Fay v. Noia, 372 US. at 435, 438.
.42. Id. at 438.
43. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1)........
44. 372 U.S. at 313; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (8).
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(5) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;45
(6) substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; 6
(7) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court
hearing;47
(8) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford
the habeas applicant a full and fair factual hearing. 4
First. The purpose of the test is to indicate the situations in
which the holding of an evidentiary hearing is mandatory. In
all other cases where the material facts are in dispute, the hold-
ing of such a hearing is in the discretion of the district judge.
If he concludes that the habeas application was afforded a full
and fair hearing by the state court resulting in reliable find-
ings, he may, and ordinarily should, accept the facts as found
in the hearing. But he need not. In every case he has the
power, constrained only by his sound discretion, to receive
evidence bearing upon the applicant's constitutional claim.
There is every reason to be confident that federal district
judges, mindful of their delicate role in the maintenance of
proper federal-state relations, will not abuse that discretion.
We have no fear that the hearing power will be used to subvert
the integrity of state criminal justice or to waste the time of
the federal courts in the trial of frivolous claims.
Second. Although the district judge may, where the state court
has reliably found the relevant facts, defer to the state court's
findings of fact, he may not defer to its findings of law. It is
the district judge's duty to apply the applicable federal law to
the state court fact findings independently. The state conclu-
sions of law may not be given binding weight on habeas. That
was settled in Browm v. Allen....
Third. A District Court sitting in habeas corpus clearly has
the power to compel production of the complete state-court
record. Ordinarily such a record-including the transcript of
testimony (or if unavailable some adequate substitute, such as
a narrative record), the pleadings, court opinions, and other
pertinent documents-is indispensable to determining whether
45. 372 US. at 313; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2).
46. 372 U.S. at 313. There is no equivalent of this requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
47. 372 U.S. at 313; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (3).
48. 372 US. at 313; 28 US.C. § 2254(d) (6).
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the habeas applicant received a full and fair state-court eviden-
tiary hearing resulting in reliable findings. Of course, if be-
cause no record can be obtained the district judge has no way
of determining whether a full and fair hearing which resulted
ing findings of relevant fact was vouchsafed, he must hold
one. So also, there may be cases in which it is more convenient
for the district judge to hold an evidentiary hearing forthwith
than compel production of the record. It is clear that he has
the power to do so.
Fourth. It rests largely with the federal district judges to give
practical form to the principles announced today. We are
aware that the too-promiscuous grant of evidentiary hearings
on habeas could both swamp the dockets of the District Courts
and cause acute and unnecessary friction with state organs of
criminal justice, while the too-limited use of such hearings
would allow many grave constitutional errors to go forever
uncorrected. The accommodation of these competing factors
must be made on the front line, by the district judges who are
conscious of their paramount responsibility in this area.49
Although Sanders"° involved a section 2255 motion, the Court in
disposing of the issue of federal applicants under this section made it
clear that the basic propositions applied to state petitioners under sec-
tion 2244 as well.
(9) At common law, the denial of a writ of habeas corpus was not res
judicata; under the guarantees of the Constitution as well as the
clear intention of the statute to simplify and restate traditional
rights recognized at common law, a modified doctrine of res
judicata applies here."
(10) Although the discretion vesting in the sentencing court under 28
U.S.C. § 2244, finality of determination of petition of habeas cor-
pus, appears to permit a modified application of res judicata (e.g.,
to terminate repetitious petitions which amount to abuse of the
remedy), the constitutional concern with governmental account-
ability for deprivation of life or liberty requires that the relief af-
forded in section 2255 be treated as the material equivalent of
section 2244.52
49. 372 U.S. at 318.
50. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
51. See id. at 15-17.
52. See id. at 14.
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Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior applica-
tion for federal habeas corpus of a § 2255 relief only if (1)
the same ground presented in the subsequent application was
determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application,
(2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the
ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of
the subsequent application .... 3
No matter how many prior applications for federal collateral
relief a prisoner has made, the principle elaborated ... supra,
cannot apply if a different ground is presented by the new ap-
plication. So too, it cannot apply if the same ground was
earlier presented but not adjudicated on the merits .... r4
3. The Accommodations of the Revised Uniform Post-Conviction Pro-
cedure Act (1965)
Because the provisions of this uniform act have provided a model
for the enactment of legislation in a number of states, and because its
basic features form the guidelines for Table 3, the 1965 Acte' is re-
printed in its entirety. Note that the changes from the 1955 Act are
shown by underlining for additions and by strike out type for deletions.
In evaluating the sections of the Uniform Law which follows, cri-
terion number 1 from the "triology" may be compared with section 1
of the Uniform Law; criterion number 2 with section 8; criteria num-
bers 4 and 7 with section 4; criteria numbers 3, 5, 6 and 8 with section
7; and criteria numbers 9 and 10 with section 2. The sections of the
Uniform Law which appear to have been emulated if not adopted by
specific state legislation, or rule of court, and which appear to satisfy
the criteria of the "trilogy" in the process, are indicated in the appro-
priate columns of Table 3 in Part V of this study, for the following
states: Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming.
A, AcT PROVIDING AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR CHALLENGING THE
LEGALITY OF ITc2lCEP£ 'O M T.ER JUMERANT F CONVICTION OF
CRIME FET AND SENTENCE )rr [.A... OIn 1r........
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 17.
55. Handbook of the National Conference of Conmzissioners on Uniforn State Laws
216 (1965).
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THEREFOR, BUT NOT AFFECTING REMEDIES INCIDENT TO THE PRO-
CEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT AND REMEDIES OF DIRECT REvIEw
OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, AND TO MAKE UNIFORM THE
LAW WITH REFERENCE THERETO
Be it enacted:
SECTION 1. [Remedy-To Whom Available-Conditions.]
(a) Any person convicted of a crime ieleiw and inearcerated
under sentence of [death or] imprisonment who claims that the
conviction was obtained or that the sentence was imposed in viola-
tion of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution
or laws of this state, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose the sentence, or that the sentence exceeds the maximum au-
thorized by law, or that the conviction or sentence is otherwise
subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error here-
tofore available under. any common law, statutory or other writ.
-motion, petition, proceeding. or remedy ... of ,1 .
wri: of^ r is, or other . . mmen law or statutory rzmedy,
may institute without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this
Act to set aside or . .r.t the s.ntn, prvid d thea alleged err-
has not been~ previously- and finally litigateed of waived in the-
proeeedings restilting itt the eotviUon or in any othe.r preeding
that the p.titier. has take n to secure relief from the his convic-
tion or sentence.
(b) The remedy herein provided is not a substitute for nor does
it affect any remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the
trial court, or any remedy of direct review of the sentence of con-
viction.-but-, Except as otherwise provided in this Act, it compre-
hends and takes the place of all other common law,-n4 statutory,
or other remedies which have heretofore been available for chal-
lenging the validity of the conviction or sentence, incarceradan
under .ntene. of [death or] imprt.m .nt, and shall be used ex-
clusively in place of them .ei- h-.ef-e-f A petition for relief under
this Act may be filed at any time.
SECTION 2. [Exercise of Original Jurisdiction in Habeas Cor-
pus.] [ [The Supreme Court, Circuit Court, District Court] in
which, by the Constitution of this state, original jurisdiction in
habeas corpus is vested, may entertain, in accordance with its
rules, a proceeding under this Act in the -a*t exercise of its original
jurisdiction. In this event, the provisions of this Act, to the extent
applicable, shall govern the proceeding.]
SECTION 3. [Conmzencement of Proceedings-Verification-Fil-
ing-Service.] [Except in a proceeding brought under section 2
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of this Act,] the proceeding is commenced by filing a petition
verified by the petitioner with the clerk of the court in which the
conviction took place. Facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner and the authenticity of all documents and exhibits
included in or attached to the petition must be.sworn to affirma-
tively as true and correct. The [Supreme Court, Court of Ap-
peals] may by rule prescribe the form of the petition and verifica-
tion. The clerk shall docket the petition upon its receipt and
promptly bring it to the attention of the court and deliver a copy
to the [prosecuting attorney, county attorney, state's attorney,
attorney general].
SEcTioN 4. [Petition-Contents.] The petition shall identify the
proceedings. in which the petitioner was convicted, give the date
of the entry of the judgment and sentence complained of, specifi-
cally set forth the grounds upon which the petition is based, and
clearly state the relief desired. All facts within the personal knowl-
edge of the petitioner shall be set forth separately from other alle-
gations of facts, and shall be verified as provided in section 3 of this
Act. Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allega-
tions shall be attached to the petition unless ee the petition recites
shal1 state why they are noi attached. The petition shall -al iden-
tify any previous proceedings. together with the grounds therein
asserted taken by +hev the petitioner has taken to secure relief from
his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and discussion of
authorities are unnecessary shal be ' nitteda .th Ft .
SEcTI oN 5. [Inability to Pay Costs. Pr....ding as a Pear Per
sei4 The petition may- allege that the petitioner is unable to pay
the costs of the proceeding or to employ counsel. If the court is
satisfied that the allegation is true, it shall ordcr that the t-iti::..
-prz..d as a poor person, a appoint counsel for him. If after
judgment, a review is sought by the petitioner or by the state, and
the reviewing heaing court is of the opinion that the requested
review if sought by the petitioner, is not frivolous is ieqes.ed hin
geed aith and the courtfinds that the petitioneris unable to pay
the costs of the review or' b employ counsel, it shall appoint coun-
sel for him. If inability to pay is determined. the . r shall order
t all necessary costs and expenses incident to the proceedings in
either the trial or reviewing court, or both theret, including all
court costs, stenographic services, printing, and reasonable com-
pensation for legal services, shall be paid by [the county in which
the judgment is rendered.]
SECTIoN 6. [Pleadings.] Within [lify -(30)] days after the
docketing of the petition, or within any further time the court
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may fix, the state shall respond by answer or motion. No further
pleadings shall be filed except as the court fily orders. At any
time prior to entry of judgment, the court may grant leave,
tim.. prier entry ef j dgn.nt, to withdraw the petition. The
court may make appropriate orders for at- amendment of the
petition or any -ther pleading, for o-as to pleading over, for
filing further pleadings, or for extending the time of the filing of
any pleading other that the .rigin.al ptin. In considering the
petition or any amendment the court shall take account of substance
regardless of defects of form.
SECTION 7. [Hearing-Evidence-Order.] [Except in a proceed-
ing brought under section 2 of this Act,] the petition shall be heard
in and before any judge of the court in which the conviction took
place and before anty ..dg .ttr.. A record of the proceedings
shall be made and kept. All existing rules and statutes applicable
in civil proceedings including pre-trial and discovery procedures
are available to the parties. The court may receive proof by af-
fidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence, and may
order the petitioner brought before it for the hearing. If the court
finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order
with respect to the conviction judgment or sentence in the former
proceedings, and any supplementary orders as to rearraignment,
retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other
matters that may be necessary and proper. The court shall make
specific findings of fact and state expressly its conclusions of law
relating to each issue presented. Thae rd- m.aking final dip
itiont ef the petitien shall elzarly state the gratunds on whieh the
ease was d,.t,.tmine,. and -whe.ther a fedral or a -state Tight ,was
presented and deid.d. This order is ee ites a final judg-
ment for purposes of review.
SECnON 8. [Waiver of-Claims.] All grounds for relief available
to -laimed-by a petitioner under this Act must be raised in his
original. supplemental. or amended petition. e-4 Any grounds-, not
so raised or finally adjudicated or knowingly or understandingly
t waived in the proceedings resulting in the conviction or sen-
tence or in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to
secure relief from his conviction or sentence may not be the basis
for a subsequent petition, unless the court - h.ing . subseuent
petition finds a grounds for relief asserted therein which for rea-
sonable cause was omitted or inadequatel ... ld not ras.nabv
have bneet raised in the original, supplemental or amended petition.
SEcriox 9. [Review.] A final judgment entered under this Act
may be reviewed by the [Supreme+ Court, Court of Appeals] of
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this state on [appeal, writ of error] brought either by the petition-
er within r - or bY the state within 6) :Mnths] from
the entry of the judgment.
SECTION 10. [Uniformity of Interpretation.] This Act shall be
so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
SECTION 11. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the Uni-
form Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
SECTION 12. [Severability.] If any provision of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid,
the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of
the Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
IV. A STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARY
In addition to abstracting statutory provisions and existing court
rules on the subject of post-conviction relief, a selected group from
each state was invited to comment upon the process of post-conviction
relief as it actually functions in that jurisdiction. The correspondence
referred to herein is maintained on file in the office of Professor Wil-
liam F. Swindler at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, Williamsburg,
Virginia. Chief justices, attorneys general, public defenders, defense
counsel, and bar association leaders in criminal law and procedure
were among those canvassed. Replies were somewhat disparate, but
for most of the states a realistic picture emerged.
The data in the following summaries consists of either excerpts from
the replies of the individuals solicited or recapitulations of the pro-
cedure set out in the statutes and court rules in the state as verified by
the responses. Where appropriate, sources of specific commentary are
indicated in the text. Twelve states were given rather extended treat-
ment, and although the remainder were covered in condensed fashion,
this does not suggest that they were less significant. By the geographic
and demographic variety of the twelve selected states, the summaries
have covered the range of procedural postures to be found in all the
states.
Alabama
Alabama criminal procedure (Alabama Code, Title 15) provides for
habeas corpus review of conviction or imprisonment by petition to the
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nearest circuit court. The statute permits either a summary or evi-
dentiary hearing. In 1963, section 380 was added to Title 15, providing
for availability of a transcript and record (without cost in cases of
indigents) and prompt review of alleged errors by the trial court. Ap-
peal lies to the appropriate reviewing court with discretion to order
a transcript and complete record for review.
Where a prisoner successfully challenged the constitutionality of his
original sentence, a second sentencing without credit for time served
on the original sentence was reviewable as constituting a penalty for
having exercised the original right of challenge. Rice v. Simpson, 271
F. Supp. 267 (M. D. Ala. 1967).
A writ of error coram nobis may be brought to raise errors in fact
dehors the record. Though there is no statutory time limit, the writ
may be lost for fallure to make a timely bid for relief. Butler v. State,
279 Ala. 331, 184 So.2d 823 (1966). The writ is apparently available
to test constitutional issues but is otherwise not freely granted as a
post-conviction remedy. See, e.g., Ex parte Hamilton, 273 Ala. 504,
142 So.2d 868 (1962); Ex parte Sealesv. State, 271 Ala. 622, 126 So.2d
474 (1961).
Alaska
Alaska's Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 purports to accomplish "the
objectives of all of the constitutional, statutory, or common law writs,"
and accordingly Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure abolishes the
writ of error coram nobis. Application for review is filed with the court
in which the conviction was obtained, with discretion in this court to
order an evidentiary hearing. Final judgment of this court may be
reviewed by the state supreme court.
Arizona
Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum may be granted at the discretion of
the trial court or members of the state supreme court. This provides
a civil proceeding collaterally attacking the legality and correctness
of detention. Rule 61 of the Rules of Civil Procedure permits appeal
in the form of a writ of error coram nobis where the ruling of the court
below "appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice." Upon
appeal from a judgment by a criminal defendant, the state supreme
court is directed by statute to review the entire record.
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It appears that the use of habeas corpus is largely restricted to chal-
lenges of the jurisdiction of the trial court. Constitutional due process
issues are cognizable only on appeal. See Holman v. State ex rel. Eyman,
5 Ariz. App. 311, 426 P.2d 411 (1967); State v. Court of Appeals Divi-
sion 2, 101 Ariz. 166, 416 P.2d 599 (1966).
Arkansas
Substantive relief is provided by Criminal Procedure Rule 1, pro-
mulgated October 18, 1965 and amended April 10, 1967. After the
usual procedure for petitioning for a review of the conviction in the
trial court, review may be had in the supreme court by submitting a
record of the proceedings in the court below. The record required of
the court below includes both written findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Habeas corpus and the common law writ of error coram nobis
are also available. See Evans v. State, 242 Ark. 92, 411 S.W. 2d 860
(1967) for the objectives of the rule, and Fleschner v. Stephens, 248
F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Ark. 1965) for a federal judge's evaluation.
California
California offers a basic post-conviction remedy in habeas corpus
(California Penal Code, §§ 1473-1506) as an alternative to the type
of relief and review available in certiorari (California Civil Procedure
Code, §§ 1067-77) and in coram nobis (California Penal Code, §§ 1265,
1487, n. 3). The then Chief Justice of the state supreme court advised
that case law has consistently expanded the remedy through habeas
corpus to meet "evolving constitutional standards to such an extent
that the statutory provisions . .. do not reflect completely or accurately
the scope of the remedy as it now exists in California." Letter from
Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor, August 15, 1969. See, e.g., In re Bell,
247 Cal. App. 2d 655, 55 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1967); Application of Oxi-
dean, 195 Cal. App. 2d 814, 16 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1961); Ex parte Win-
chester, 53 Cal. 2d 528, 348 P.2d 904, 2 Cal. Rptr. 296, cert. denied,
363 U.S. 852 (1960). But see In re Streeter, 66 Cal. 2d 47, 423 P.2d
976, 56 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1967).
This is also the view of a California law professor, who wrote:
Our Supreme Court has expanded habeas corpus in a number of
respects. It is now clear that it is the proper remedy to collaterally
attack a conviction claimed to have been procured in violation of
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constitutional rights. See People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 210
P.2d 13 (1949). Not only has the court permitted it to be used
by persons not actually in custody, but has also used it increasingly
as a device to procure in effect a declaratory judgment where
the petitioner does not even claim to be entitled to release. See
In re Consalves, 48 Cal. 2d 638, 311 P.2d 483 (1957) (habeas corpus
can be used to procure a declaration that an appeal was properly
taken); In re Rye, 152 Cal. App. 2d 594, 313 P.2d 914 (1957) (dec-
laration that consecutive sentences improperly imposed). One can
still find old cases of more restrictive stripe but I have little doubt
of the ability of intelligent counsel to raise almost any issue that
can be raised in other states under statutory post-conviction reme-
dies.
This correspondent appended to his letter a lengthy list of state cases
concerning the use of habeas corpus for post-conviction review and
relief. The cases included those which attacked judgments based on
pretrial and trial errors, attacked sentences or confinements, inquired
into the treatment of prisoners, questioned decisions on parole and ex-
tradition warrants, and discussed questions in relation to appeals. The
writer concludes:
Another remedy that ought to be mentioned, although in a tech-
nical sense it could be said not to be a post-conviction remedy, is
the petition to recall the remittitur. This enables the petitioner
to reopen an appeal long after the time for rehearing in the ap-
pellate court has run. Though the older cases suggest that its use
is strictly limited to situations where there were serious defects
in the original appeal, almost amounting to fraud on the appellate
court, in the last few years the courts have used it in a number of
situations without much inquiry as to the technical requirements.
Though in theory this is simply a continuation of the original
appeal, it permits the defendant relief that would otherwise be
collateral.
Letter from Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., September 4, 1969.
This view is counterbalanced by the statements of a San Francisco
practitioner and former law clerk in the federal system, who says that
he "think[s] the California Supreme Court under former Chief Justice
Traynor (1) did not represent the general attitude and disposition of
most lower-court judges, and (2) when the Supreme Court considers
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a case it is able to devote considerably more time than any other court
could probably devote to a prisoner application for post-conviction re-
lief." The background of many trial judges, the correspondent states,
tend to make them "generally anti-post-conviction relief."
As for the intermediate courts in California, there too the judges
are extremely over-worked handling a flood of civil and criminal
appeals. ... Courts go out of their way in this state to affirm
criminal convictions. The law in the intermediate appellate courts
in California is horribly confused and, I think it is fair to say, ...
you can find a case standing for virtually any proposition. The
intermediate California courts do have a position filled usually by
a recent law school graduate who is assigned the duty of review-
ing all applications for writs of all kinds.... The law clerks them-
selves devote much if not most of their time to non-prisoner prob-
lems. In short, the California courts-both superior and appellate
-simply do not have or take the time to deal adequately (in my
opinion) with the many applications for post-conviction relief
that they receive....
The evidentiary hearings are much more flexible in Federal
courts than in California courts. In all the time I was a law clerk
in the federal court, considering all the prisoners who had sought
post-conviction non-appellate relief in state courts, and who sub-
sequently filed for relief in the federal court, having been denied
relief in the state system, not more than 2% or 3% received
any evidentiary hearing and not more than 10% received any
statement of the reasons their relief was being denied. In the Fed-
eral court, in my experience, perhaps 5% to 10% received eviden-
tiary hearings and almost 100% of the cases resulted in individual-
ized opinions or short orders stating the bases of any ruling. Con-
sequently, the federal appellate courts are able to more intelligently
pass upon claims that reach them. The fact that the California
courts do not give reasons for their denial is a fact which the
[Federal Judicial Center] committee should be especially inter-
ested in, for with the inadequate consideration in the state courts
and with no basis for determining why the state courts took the
action [they] did, federal courts have no basis for ruling that
a state prisoner procedurally waived any claims in the state court.
In the face of silent denials by the state courts, there is little al-
ternative for federal courts but to fully consider the petitioner's
allegations on the assumption that he is entitled to raise them and
that he never deliberately bypassed any available state remedy.
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Letter from Steven M. Kipperman, September 25, 1969.
Coram nobis is available to secure relief, where no other remedy ex-
ists, from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which
would have prevented its rendition had the trial court known of it and
where the lack of knowledge was not a result of the defendant's negli-
gence. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 210 P.2d 13 (1949); Wil-
lians v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 197 P.2d 341 (1948); People v. Coyle,
88 Cal. App. 2d 967, 200 P.2d 546 (1948). It is not a proper vehicle for
review of alleged denial of constitutional rights. People v. Williams,
253 Cal. App. 2d 560, 61 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1967); People v. Adamson,
34 Cal. 2d 320, 210 P.2d 13 (1949).
The problems pointed up by these observations of California, a major
state in consideration of its economic and population status, are under-
lined by the statistics in Table 1-k in Part II of this study, concerning
the Northern District of California; see also the data in Table 2, supra,
and Part V, infra.
Colorado
Recent state adjustments of post-conviction procedure required by
the 1963 "trilogy" are well illustrated by changes in Colorado law. In-
formation provided by Justice Edward E. Pringle (member of the
Federal Judicial Center committee) documents the change to a degree
not yet reflected in available statutory records. As Table 1-L in Part
II supra indicates, the volume of petitions for federal habeas corpus in
Colorado has been declining steadily since 1964-the first year after the
"trilogy" and two years before the systematic reform urged upon the
state trial judges began to have general effect. In this connection, the
following comment from Justice Pringle's opinion in People v. Bradley,
- Colo. -, 455 P.2d 199 (1969) is pertinent:
Rule 35(a) provides that where a sentence is illegal the sentenc-
ing courts may correct it at any time. There is no requirement
contained in the rule that such a matter must be raised on writ of
error from the conviction or be thereafter waived. Moreover, this
court no longer adheres to the letter of Rule 35(b) which provides
that constitutional errors must be of a sort not effectively subject
to review on writ of error from the conviction. We are now com-
mitted to the philosophy that error consisting of a violation of
constitutional rights of a prisoner may be raised in a 35(b) pro-
ceeding so long as it was not previously raised and disposed of on
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writ of error. See De Baca v. District Court, - Colo. _ 431
P.2d 763; Segura v. People, - Colo. -, 431 P.2d 768; Brown
v. People, 162 Colo. 406, 426 P.2d 764; Lauderdale v. People, 162
Colo. 36, 424 P.2d 373; Buckles v. People, 162 Colo. 51, 424 P.2d
774, where we have heard constitutional issues in 35(b) proceed-
ings and decided them on their merits, although the same issues
could have been effectively raised on writ of error to the con-
viction....
A September 10, 1969, letter from Justice Pringle adds:
Even before the Bradley case was announced, the federal courts
in Colorado for several years recognized that the rule stated in
Bradley was the rule in Colorado and have governed themselves
accordingly .... All of our state judges have been instructed at
our last three judicial conferences that whenever it appeared on
the face of the petition that post-conviction relief would be granted
if the allegations therein made were true, the trial court must
hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact. Our state
judges follow this rule. Our federal judges recognize that this rule
is being followed in Colorado and review the findings of fact made
by the trial court and apply the provisions of [28] U.S.C. § 2254
as recently amended in determining whether they should afford
an evidentiary hearing. Such evidentiary hearings are almost never
granted in our federal District Courts any more.
Connecticut
The statutory provisions set out in Section 52-470 of the Connecticut
General Statutes stipulates that habeas corpus applications alleging error
in the conviction of a defendant may be heard by the trial court in the
vicinity, and admonishes the judge to "inquire fully into the cause of
imprisonment, and thereupon dispose of the case as law and justice
require." Appeal is allowed only upon timely petition to the judge who
held the hearing, or to a justice of the supreme court to certify a re-
viewable question.
An indigent state prisoner represented by a private attorney is not
required to seek state habeas corpus before petitioning for federal habeas
corpus where an entry fee is required by state law unless the party was
represented by a public defender. Rush v. York, 281 F. Supp. 779
(D. Conn. 1967). See Vena v. Warden, State Prison, 154 Conn, 363, 225
A.2d 802 (1966) for the scope of habeas corpus in treating constitu-
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tional due process questions. See also Williams v. Reincke, 157 Conn.
143, 249 A.2d 252 (1968).
Dela'ware
Supreme Court Rule 40 provides for the filing of a motion by the
prisoner in the court which sentenced him, accompanied by an affidavit
setting out the ground upon which relief is sought and alleging that errors
or irregularities in the trial resulted in the illegal sentence. Upon due
notice to the attorney general, a hearing is held by the court. Rule 35
(Criminal) of the Superior Court, amended June 1, 1969, which pro-
vides that any person convicted and sentenced by the trial court may
file a motion for post-conviction relief on any meritorious claim, is
much broader. Unless the record satisfies the court that the motion
should be denied, notice is given to the attorney general, and a hearing
is held to determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law with reference to the motion. A complete record of the
post-conviction review is the result. See Rocker v. State, 240 A.2d 141
(Del. 1968); Priest v. State, 227 A.2d 576 (Del. 1967) for applications
of Rule 35.
Florida
Florida Rule 1.850, adopted shortly after Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), provides that a prisoner may move the court which
imposed sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct it. Unless the motion,
files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is not
entitled to relief, the court is required to give notice to the prosecuting
attorney of a timely hearing at which findings of fact and conclusions
of law are established. See Devlin v. State, 192 So. 2d 786 (Fla. App.
1966). The writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis both lie in Florida
within their traditional scope, but Rule 1.850 contains some limitation
on habeas corpus use.
Georgia
A substantial amendment to the habeas corpus statute of Georgia was
adopted in 1967, Georgia Code Annotated, § 50-127 (Supp. 1969). By
its terms, a prisoner may sue a writ in the trial court in the county in
which he is being detained, submitting a complete record of prior
proceedings. The court is directed to serve notice on the prosecutor,
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and to hold a timely hearing at which a transcript of findings of fact
and conclusions of law is compiled. Defense counsel agree, however,
that enforcement of the statute, particularly with reference to constitu-
tional rights of prisoners, is virtually meaningless. Court-appointed
counsel allegedly neglect to perfect appeals from trial court findings,
and defense counsel at the trial level neglect or are denied opportunity
to object to rulings violative of due process.
Although little used, the writ of error coram nobias is available, Mirgala
v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828, 111 S.E. 655 (1921), and an extraordinary mo-
tion for a new trial may be used to raise the issue of newly discovered
evidence under Georgia Code Annotated, title 70, §§ 70-301 to 303
(1933).
Hawaii
Habeas corpus is the prescribed statutory process for securing post-
conviction review. Hawaii Revised Statutes, §§ 660-1 to -33 (1968).
Every person deprived of his liberty, except for a felony conviction,
may prosecute the writ as of right, while the excepted class may seek
the writ by petition to justices of the state supreme court. In the
felony situation, the trial court is directed to issue a show cause order
to the detaining party. In both cases, timely notice is given to the
prosecuting attorney, and a full hearing with a record complete as to
findings of fact and conclusions of law is held. There is no evidence
of use of the writ of error coram nobis.
Idaho
Idaho is one of the states which has adopted the Uniform Post-Con-
viction Procedure Act. Prior to 1967 when the Act was adopted, statu-
tory relief had largely replaced common law relief. Cf. State v. Iverson,
79 Idaho 25, 310 P. 2d 803 (1957) holding that coram nobis had been
preempted by statutory remedies; Beus v. Terrell, 46 Idaho 635, 269
P. 593 (1928), limiting writ of review or writ of error to cases where
no appeal is provided by law. Complete records of evidentiary hearings
appear to be insured by the present statutory structure. Section 19-
4901 (b) of the Idaho Code exclusively supersedes all other common
law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging
the validity of the conviction or sentence.
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Illinois
A wealth of material was provided by correspondents in this state,
but perhaps the most meaningful manner of stating the present post-
conviction process in Illinois is to quote from a memorandum prepared
by George J. Cotsirilos, a defense attorney in Chicago. Letter from
Richard E. Eagleton, October 24, 1969.
As amended June 4, 1965, § 122-1, Chapter 38 [Illinois Criminal
Procedure Code] now allows twenty years after rendition of final
judgment within which proceedings may be commenced, and this
period may be extended if the petitioner alleges facts showing
that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence.
Remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is limited to
constitutional issues and does not provide an opportunity for re-
determination of guilt or innocence of defendant. People v. Ornd-
nzoff, 39 Ml. 2d 96, 233 N.E. 2d 378 (1968).
It is not the function of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to have
claims considered which were considered upon direct review of
conviction, or which could have been presented on direct review of
conviction. People v. Thomas, 38 Ill. 2d 321, 231 N.E. 2d 436
(1967).
To secure a plenary hearing, petitioner under Post-Conviction
Hearing Act must make a substantial showing of violation of a
constitutional right, and the allegation of a mere conclusion to
that effect under oath will not suffice. People v. Hill, 39 Ill. 2d 61,
233 N.E. 2d 546 (1968). The allegations in the petition must be
supported by records in the case, or by accompanying affidavits
unless absence of same is sufficiently explained. People v. Evans,
37 Ill. 2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 778 (1967).
It is not the intent of Post-Conviction Hearing Act that consti-
tutional claims made in the petition be adjudicated on pleadings,
and function of pleadings in proceedings under the Act is to de-
termine whether petitioner is entitled to a hearing. People v. Clem-
ents, 38 Ill. 2d 213, 230 N.E. 2d 185 (1967).
No extrinsic evidence is required when petitioner's claims are
based on matters of record. People v. Airmers, 34 Ill. 2d 222, 215
N.E. 2d 225 (1966). However, when a claim of substantial con-
stitutional denial is based on assertions beyond the record, the Act
contemplates that evidence be taken. People v. Sigafus, 39 Il. 2d
68, 233 N.E. 2d 386 (1968).
In the event that the trial court dismisses the petition and denies
a hearing or holds a hearing but refuses to grant the relief asked
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for, the decision may be appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court because of the constitutional nature of the claim.
Under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Chapter 110, I.R.S.),
a criminal defendant may petition the trial court to set aside his
conviction if the trial judge was not aware of an important fact
that would have affected the disposition of the case, assuming that
the defendant was not at fault for failing to apprise the judge of
the fact. The Section 72 petition is used to "set aside a conviction
obtained by duress or fraud, or the conviction results from the
excusable mistake or ignorance of the accused."
Section 72 may be used where a nonconstitutional issue which
might have affected the disposition of the case was not brought
to the attention of the trial court. The action must be brought
within two years of the conviction unless the facts were fraudu-
lently concealed or unless the defendant was under a legal disa-
bility. Aft adverse ruling on the Section 72 petition may be ap-
pealed to the Illinois Appellate Court. The State writ of habeas
corpus (Chap. 65, I.R.S.), is limited in scope by the coverage of
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The habeas corpus procedure
may be used to test the duration of sentence and the application
of parole procedures. People ex rel. Gregory v. Page, 31 IIl. 2d
592, 203 N.E. 2d 425.
Indiana
The state supreme court reorganized its post-conviction procedure
by a set of rules promulgated August 1, 1969. While preserving alter-
nate rights of appeal and habeas corpus, the rules provide for standard-
ized forms which guide petitioners to all the material allegations required
for perfecting their petitions and require a full evidentiary hearing with
a written record of all proceedings and the judgment of the court.
Appeal on this record lies to the supreme court. Supreme Court Rule
P.C. 1 § 1 (b) comprehends and exclusively supersedes all common law
and statutory remedies previously available for challenging the validity
of conviction or sentence. Habeas corpus is retained ostensibly for
constitutional purposes. See also Supreme Court Rule P.C. 2 § 1 (belated
motion for new trial) and Supreme Court Rule P.C. 2 § 2 (belated
appeal).
Iowa
Habeas corpus statutes have been construed as the proper medium for
collateral attack upon the validity of a conviction. It is made to the
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nearest court or judge, and if disallowed the reasons for such denial
must be explained and included in the return of the writ. Iowa Code
§ 663.7 (1966). Habeas corpus in Iowa appears available to test con-
stitutional issues on the theory that violation of such rights divests a
court of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Frank v. Bennett, - Iowa -, 162
N.W.2d 404 (1968); Scalf v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1068, 128 N.W.2d 903
(1964).
Kansas
In 1963 Kansas adopted a post-conviction statute, Kansas Statutes
Annotated § 60-1507, based substantially on 28 U.S.C. 2255. There-
after, a committee of state judges, acting in consultation with United
States District Court judges in Kansas, drafted Supreme Court Rule 121
to implement the statute and provide standardized forms for motions
attacking sentences. Kansas Statutes Annotated § 60-1507 and imple-
menting Supreme Court Rule 121 are intended to supersede all formerly
available means of post-conviction review, except direct appeal of trial
errors. The use of "1507 motions" has become the usual method of
seeking relief, although statutory means of habeas corpus and direct
appeal from judgment are still available.
Lack of legal advice handicaps many prisoners in perfecting petitions
even with standardized forms. Additionally, the procedure fails to take
into consideration allegations (incompetency of counsel, coercion of
witnesses, unconstitutional search and seizure) which could not have
appeared in the record of the trial, since, in such instances under the
present practice, the courts refuse to grant evidentiary hearings.
Kentucky
Under Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42 prisoners may petition to
attack their sentences by motion in the sentencing court. Where the
court is satisfied that a material question has been raised which cannot
be answered on the face of the record, it is required to hold a hearing
and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. A final order is
thereupon entered. In the absence of a showing that the remedy by
motion under Rule 11.42 is inadequate, the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will be dismissed. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Thomas, 382 S.W.2d
871 (Ky. 1964); Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1964).
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Louisiana
Although there is a statute for "correction of illegal sentence" (Code
of Criminal Procedure, article 882, Louisiana Statutes Annotated), the
usual post-conviction remedy is statutory habeas corpus. Section 362,
clause 9, of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for discharge of
the person in custody if "he was convicted without due process of law."
This simple post-conviction feature may meet the federal standards. A
summary hearing is provided with review in the state supreme court.
Inadequacy of a record of post-conviction review appears to prompt
a regular reliance on petitions for habeas corpus in the federal court.
Maine
In 1963, the year of the federal "trilogy," Maine made a comprehen-
sive revision of its post-conviction procedure modernizing the remedies
recognized in the common law writ of error coram nobis, and the statu-
tory writs of error in criminal appeals and habeas corpus. A letter from
the office of the Attorney General, dated October 2, 1969, advised that
the existing statute is considered superior to the Uniform Post-Convic-
tion Procedure Act of 1965. Specifically, Maine's statute clearly spells
out the mechanics by which a post-conviction case is to be moved
toward adjudication. Also, Maine's statute has wide application by
virtue of the fact that the action is available to persons incarcerated, on
parole, on probation, or fined, as well as to the juvenile offender. Cf.
Note, How Post is Post-Conviction Relief in Maine?, 21 University of
Maine Law Review 241 (1969) (pointing out that relief does not apply
to a petitioner discharged from custody); Tboreson v. State, 239 A.2d
654 (Me. 1968).
A memorandum from the Attorney General's office describes in detail
the provisions and functioning of the 1963 Maine statute:
The basis for post-conviction habeas corpus is found in Sections
5502-5508 of Title 14 of the Maine Revised Statutes. The refer-
ence sections incorporate the substantive reasons for Writ of Error
in a criminal case and Writ of Error Coram Nobis into the Habeas
Corpus statute. Section 5502 lays the precepts for post-conviction
relief. That Section provides that any person (including any ju-
venile offender, or person on probation or parole) convicted of
a crime (including persons fined) who claims that he is illegally
imprisoned, or that errors of law of record have been made, or
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that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of
the United States or of this State, or that there were errors of fact
not of record which were not known to the accused or to the
Court and which by the use of reasonable diligence could not have
been known to the accused at the time of trial and which, if
known, would have prevented conviction, may institute a petition
for the Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking release from illegal im-
prisonment, correction of any error of law of record or for the
purpose of setting aside the plea, conviction and sentence ...
[H]abeas corpus is not a substitute for nor does it affect any rem-
edies incidental to the trial court proceedings; nor is it a substitute
for other review of the sentence or conviction. A petition may be
filed at any time once the conviction is final.
Section 5503 delineates the procedure for commencement of a
post-conviction action....
Section 5504 lists material which must be alleged in the petition
in order that the particular judgment and sentence complained of
be specifically described. Argument, citations and discussion of
authorities are to be omitted from the petition; but may be filed in
a separate document.
Section 5505 requires the Attorney General to file a responsive
pleading to the petition within 20 days next following the date
on which the petition was received in the Attorney General's of-
fie.... The hearing, although usually held in the county where
the conviction occurred, may be held in any county in the State.
An indigent petitioner may, on request, have counsel appointed
to represent him. Amendments to the pleadings are liberally
allowed. . . The decision making final disposition of the case
constitutes a final judgment for the purpose of review.
Section 5507 recites that those grounds for relief claimed by a
petitioner under this post-conviction statute must be raised in the
original or amended petition; and any grounds not so raised are
waived unless either the State or Federal Constitution otherwise
requires or any Justice, on considering a subsequent petition, finds
grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been
raised in the original or amended petition. In any event, a peti-
tioner appearing pro se who finds his petition dismissed for failure
to recite valid facts is not precluded from again prosecuting a
petition containing new material.
Section 5508 contains language relating to appeal of post-convic-
tion actions. Both the petitioner and the State are entitled to
appeal.
Although Sections 5502-5508 provide for post-conviction habeas
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corpus, any court decisions relating to either Habeas Corpus, Writ
of Error Coram Nobis, or Writ of Error in a criminal case may
still be recited as material case law when applicable. The post-
conviction statute, appearing in its present form, was enacted in
1963. Simultaneously the statutes relating to both Writ of Error
in a criminal case and Writ of Error Coram Nobis were repealed.
Maine's post-conviction remedy was not enacted as a result of
recent Supreme Court of the United States decisions extending the
rights of individuals in habeas corpus proceedings. For example,
at the time the United States Supreme Court decided Case v. Ne-
braska, 381 U.S. 336 (decided May 24, 1965), the post-conviction
remedy in Maine, as we know it today, had already been enacted.
For many years, Maine has provided the post-conviction remedies
of Habeas Corpus, Writ of Error in a criminal case, and Writ of
Error Coram Nobis; and it was in 1963 that the Legislature enacted
this single statute, containing all three actions, following the Legis-
lature's awareness that petitioners were utilizing the three separate
procedures, one after the other, with a single unchanged set of
facts or issue of law.
A very broad interpretation of the 1963 post-conviction act was
enunciated in Green v. State, 245 A.2d 147, 150 (Me. 1968):
Our post-conviction habeas corpus however was not intended to
be a mere consolidated substitute for former remedies with their
limited and fixed common law connotations, but designed as it was
to be the sole and exclusive method of collateral attack upon the
legality of a conviction and sentence . . . it must be given such
reasonable flexibility within the spirit of the statutory enactment
that it may be an effective procedural vehicle for collaterally reach-
ing all fundamental defects in the administration of criminal justice.
Maryland
Maryland adopted the original Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act in 1958 and comprehensively revised it in 1965 (Maryland Acts
1965, chapter 442). A state prisoner may seek direct review by appeal
from the original judgment, and if a petition for such review is unsuc-
cessful he may then attack the conviction collaterally through the Uni-
form Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Article 27, § 645A of the Mary-
land Code Annotated (1957) provides for such attack where the alleged
error has not been litigated or waived in the course of the proceedings
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leading to the conviction, or on direct appeal, or on common law pro-
ceedings in habeas corpus or coram nobis. This section is implemented
by Supreme Court Rules BK 4048, and supersedes the common law
writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis as a post-conviction remedy.
Massachusetts
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, like Maine, considers that its
post-conviction remedies are more flexible and effective than the revised
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. In 1966, the state legislature
entertained a bill providing for the adoption of the model act, but a
study concluded that the existing writ of error procedure, Massachusetts
General Laws, chapter 250, §§ 1, 2, 9-13 (1959), was substantially more
flexible, and the bill did not pass. Cf. Bernardin, Writ of Error in Crim-
inal Cases, 47 Massachusetts Law Quarterly 37 (1962).
The following is an exerpt from a letter from the Post-Conviction
Division of the Massachusetts Defenders Committee, dated October 2,
1969, which suggests some of the difficulties of the general statutory
procedure in practice:
We have in this state ... a statutory procedure for the direct
appeal of criminal convictions. This direct appeal is assured to
every convicted person and it brings all matters of law that are
preserved by objection and exception to the supreme court of this
Commonwealth. Frequently the court will also examine the fac-
tual record to see whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant
a finding whether it be by the jury or by the trial judge in jury
waived session. We have a number of problems that arise in this
course of direct appeal. An example of a serious discrepancy is
that of furnishing typewritten transcripts of trial. There is a
stenographer present recording in stenotype all testimony and all
verbal exchanges during the course of trials in our superior court,
which is the jury trial court in this state. This stenotyped record
which is readable only to stenotype trained operators, is not tran-
scribed into typewritten form unless the stenographer is paid or
the court orders a transcript to be furnished the parties at govern-
ment expense. If a defendant can pay for a typewritten transcript
this is of great value in the preparation of his appeal. If a defendant
is unable to pay then only by motion and order of the court can
the transcript be obtained. Of course most defendants in felony
cases do not have funds to pay for a transcript and reliance must
be placed with the trial judge. Some trial judges frequently grant
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typewritten transcripts and some do so very rarely. This is a
source of grave inequity and injustice. There are many obstacles
in the way of properly presenting a direct appeal if counsel is de-
nied a typewritten transcript of the trial and yet this is so often
the case that it is almost accepted as traditional in this state.
In our post-conviction area of activity we- use civil rather than
criminal remedies. Direct appeal is a criminal remedy but we do
not use this course of review. Our remedies are generally by peti-
tion for writ of error, mandamus, declaratory judgment, habeas
corpus, and certiorari. All of these latter remedies are on the civil
side and utilize the civil procedures available in this state.
If a prisoner has exhausted our state remedies and has gone to
our state supreme court he may seek review by way of petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the local federal court.
Coram nobis has been largely superseded by the writ of error, Com-
monwealth v. Phelan, 271 Mass. 21, 171 N.E. 53 (1930), and case law
indicates a reliance on the writ of error to attack a conviction and sen-
tence allegedly obtained by virtue of a denial of constitutional rights.
See Crowell v. Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 288, 289, 225 N.E.2d 330
(1967): "Habeas corpus cannot be employed as a substitute for ordinary
appellate procedure and so in general is not available where there is a
remedy by writ of error or appeal.... The petitioner does have a rem-
edy by writ of error. In many cases the issue of lack of representation
by counsel has been raised on writ of error."
Michigan
There appears to be no clear-cut post-conviction procedure in Michi-
gan. The Revised Judicature Act of 1961, Public Act 1961, No. 236,
sets out a broad habeas corpus remedy available to any person restrained
of his liberty for any cause by a state agency. Prompt return on the
writ, with complete record available for review, and credit for time
served on any void sentence where a prisoner is resentenced, is pro-
vided for. Coram nobis is rendered obsolete by statutory methods of
correcting factual error. See Dewey v. Smith, 250 Mich. 377, 230 N.W.
180 (1930).
Minnesota
The Minnesota post-conviction law, Minnesota Statutes Annotated,
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§§ 590.01-.06 (Supp. Vol. 38, 1970), was enacted in 1967 and sub-
stantially amended in 1969. The amended law makes possible review
of the original record where a prisoner is seeking resentencing as well as
discharge or new trial. Appeal from the conviction may be stayed
while an application is taken to the trial court for an evidentiary hear-
ing under the post-conviction act, so that, in the event of an adverse
ruling on this issue, the transcript of the hearing will provide a more
complete presentation of the factual issues on the appeal. In the case of
appeal or post-conviction action, prisoners are provided with the serv-
ices of a practicing attorney.
Although the post-conviction remedies under sections 590.01-.06
impliedly supersede remedies by habeas corpus and coram nobis, habeas
corpus had previously been expanded to permit inquiry into alleged
violations of freedoms considered to be "basic and fundamental." State
ex rel. Coe v. Tohash, 269 Minn. 1, 129 N.W.2d 903 (1964).
Mississippi
The following description of the state post-conviction procedure was
received in a letter, dated March 26, 1969, from Chief Justice W. N.
Ethridge, Jr., of the Mississippi Supreme Court.
The post-conviction remedy may be divided into two categories:
(1) Where the Mississippi Supreme Court has affirmed the con-
viction, it is necessary that the petitioner file in this Court an ap-
plication for leave to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis
in the trial court. Miss. Code 1942 Ann. § 1992.5 (1956). If the
petition states a prima facie case, the court will direct the trial
court to have a hearing on it, in order to determine whether a new
trial should be granted. Smith v. State, 155 So. 2d 494 (Miss. 1966).
Mississippi Supreme Court Rule 38 provides a procedure for these
applications, as follows:
"Every application for leave to file in the lower court a petition
for writ of error coram nobis shall have attached the original and
two executed counterparts of the petition proposed to be filed
in the lower court, which shall be sworn to by petitioner. Peti-
tioner's affidavit shall designate specifically what facts, if any,
alleged in the petition are within the personal knowledge of peti-
tioner. When the petition contains allegations of fact not within
the personal knowledge of petitioner, it shall have attached af-
fidavit or affidavits of some other person or persons having
[Vol. 12:147
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
knowledge of the facts which are not within the personal knowl-
edge of petitioner. The failure to attach such affidavits of per-
sons other than petitioner may be excused upon good cause
shown. The petition shall state when the facts relied upon for
issuance of the writ came to petitioner's knowledge, and shall
state sufficient facts to show that there was no want of reasonable
diligence on the part of petitioner or his counsel. The petition
shall be endorsed by a statement by petitioner's counsel, if any,
that he believes the petition for a writ of error coram nobis is
well taken, and should be issued. The application shall be sup-
ported by a brief, and failure to file a supporting brief may be
ground for dismissal. In the event leave is granted to file the
petition, the original and one executed counterpart of the pe-
tition shall be withdrawn and filed in the lower court."
(2) Where the sentence was not appealed and has not been af-
firmed by the Supreme Court, petitioner may file a motion in
the trial court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence, and to order a new trial. This simple motion
procedure is discussed in detail in the case of In Re Broom's Pe-
tition, 251 Miss. 25, 168 So.2d 44 (1964). Sometimes this pro-
cedure is referred to as a petition for coram nobis, but as was
stated in Broom, the preferable method is by simple petition.
With reference to category (1), where this Court considers that
the statutory coram nobis in the Supreme Court is not proper, this
Court has used a relief supplemental to coram nobis. Lang v. State,
230 Miss. 147, 92 So.2d 670 (1957); or later hearing, Lang v. State,
232 Miss. 616, 100 So.2d 138 (1958).
In summary, if the sentence has been affirmed by the Mississippi
Supreme Court, petitioner must first file an application in this
Court for leave to apply for a new trial in the trial court. This will
be granted if the application states a prima facie case and complies
with the rules of this Court. If the conviction was not appealed
and affirmed, petitioner can file a simple motion in the trial court
for a new trial, on which he may have a hearing to determine
whether he should be granted a new trial. A denial of that right
is appealable to the Supreme Court. Windon v. State, 192 So.2d
689 (Miss. 1966). These rights to post-conviction remedies have
recently been broadened by the Mississippi Supreme Court to
cover post-commitment orders of the Youth Court. Love v. State,
No. 45, 239, decided March 24, 1969, and not yet reported in the
Southern Reporter. That case contains a review of the post-
conviction cases, and applies their principles to the Youth Court.
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Coram nobis lies not only to raise issues of facts dehors the record
but to test issues of abridgment of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Love
v. State, __ Miss. ---, 221 So.2d 92 (1969); In Re Brooms Petition, 251
Miss. 25, 168 So. 2d 44 (1964). Habeas corpus in Mississippi is limited
to inquiry into the competency and jurisdiction of the tribunal. Jackson
v. Waller, 248 Miss. 166, 156 So.2d 594 (1963); Smith v. State, __ Miss.
___ 155 So.2d 494 (1963).
Missouri
A comprehensive summary of Missouri procedure appears in an ar-
ticle by Louis C. DeFeo, Jr., in 20 Journal of the Missouri Bar 448
(1964):
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26 provides a civil procedure
by which one sentenced and in custody for a crime may put in
issue before his trial court defects in his conviction and sentence
which are so fundamental as to make the judgment itself invalid.
"Rule 27.26 affords a prisoner a convenient means for a direct
attack on the judgment of conviction by motion in the original
proceeding. The attack is governed by the general principles
applicable to a habeas corpus proceeding within the grounds
specified in Rule 27.26, and will lie only where the judgment
of conviction is void or otherwise subject to collateral attack."
State v. Thompson, Mo., 324 SW2d 133, 135.
Although called a rule of procedure, Rule 27.26 has all the at-
tributes of a substantive remedy. Pleadings are filed. An eviden-
tiary hearing may be conducted. The order of the court is deemed
a final judgment and may be reviewed by appeal. Pertinent rules
of trial and appellate procedure apply to the proceedings. ...
Rule 27.26 is closely related to its historical predecessors, coram
nobis and habeas corpus. Writs of error coram nobis and habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum are of ancient common law origin and are
presently available remedies in Missouri. Rule 27.26 provides a
remedy in addition to these ancient writs. State prisoners have
available all three remedies in a proper case. Habeas corpus and
coram nobis are civil and not criminal proceedings; Rule 27.26
is likewise a civil proceeding governed by rules of civil procedure.
The application must show that the applicant is a prisoner in
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custody under sentence and claiming a right to be released. As in
habeas corpus, the applicant must be presently and actually in
custody. State v. Knight, Mo. App., 351 SW2d 802. A sentence
already served cannot be attacked under the Rule even though
such sentence may be the basis for present punishment under the
habitual criminal act. State v. Stodulski, Mo., 298 SW2d 420. A
sentence already served may be attacked under coram nobis, . . .
United States v. Morgan, 346 US 502. As in habeas corpus, the
Rule 27.26 applicant must be seeking release....
... Rule 27.26 is not an appeal of the original criminal trial and
not the forum for reviewing trial errors. State v. Hecke, Mo., 328
SW2d 41, 43; State v. Childers, Mo., 328 SW2d 43, 45.
Only when the court orders a hearing does the Rule require the
court to notify the prosecuting attorney of the application. How-
ever, it would be good practice if the prosecuting attorney were
notified of all applications and made a response in all but patently
frivolous cases.
An answer or response is not expressly required by the Rule.
.. "Defendant's allegations in support of such a motion are not
to be taken as admitted merely because the State has not denied
them." State v. Richardson, Mo., 347 SW2d 168. Thus it is not
mandatory that the State deny the applicant's allegations by a re-
sponsive pleading. Of course, this does not mean that the appli-
cant's allegations need not be rebutted at all. If the allegations of
the application are not refuted by the files and records of the case
or the evidence presented at hearing, on appeal the allegations
will be considered as though they were true.
The question of whether or not an evidentiary hearing must
be held is distinct from the question of whether the applicant is
entitled to relief. The pleadings should give separate attention
to this question. Erroneous denial of a hearing will result in hav-
ing to relitigate the whole application.
Rule 27.26 states:
"Unless the motion and the files and records of the case show
to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served on the
prosecuting attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, deter-
mine the issues and make finding of fact and conclusions of law
with respect thereto."
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The virtue of such a comprehensive inquiry is that successive
applications raising piece-meal grounds for relief are prevented.
The court must entertain successive applications which are based
upon different grounds (unless there is an abuse of remedy).
However, if a comprehensive record is made at the first hearing,
this record becomes part of the "files and records of the case"
and, to the extent that these files and records conclusively show
that no relief is due the applicant, successive applications may be
summarily denied.
The Rule expressly requires findings of fact and conclusions
of law in cases where a hearing is conducted. We shall not discuss
such cases; the directive of the Rule is clear.
The Rule does not expressly require written findings in cases
which do not require an evidentiary hearing. However, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court has stated:
".. . undoubtedly it is good practice for a summary order of
denial to show that the motion, files and records establish that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief." State v. Rutledge, supra,
1.c., 365, 368.
Under Rule 27.26 the trial court may dispose of an application
without a hearing, even when the application states a claim for
relief and raises apparent fact issues, if the files and records of the
case conclusively refute the factual allegations....
If the trial court denies an application without a hearing because
the files and records of the case conclusively refute the applicant's
allegations, the appellate court will not presume that there are
records and files which refute the allegations. The appellate court
must see to believe. If no hearing is conducted, ". . . the factual
allegations of the application as we determined them to be by a
liberal interpretation, must for purposes of the appeal be accepted
as true." State v. Moreland, supra.
On appeal the matter will be disposed of upon the "solemnly
agreed to and officially filed transcript." Matter which is not con-
tained in the transcript will not be considered by the court on
appeal. State v. Burrington, Mo., 71 SW2d 319, 320. It is there-
fore necessary that the transcript contain all records, files, evidence,
etc., which are relevant to a full and fair appellate review. If the
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criminal proceeding was appealed, the court on appeal may take
judicial notice of the contents of the criminal transcript.
Rule 27.26 states that "the Court need not entertain... succes-
sive motions for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner."
Where issues of fact and law have been adjudicated on the merits
in a prior 27.26 proceeding, the court may summarily dismiss a
subsequent application alleging the same grounds. State v. Hurst,
Mo., 347 SW2d 177, 178.
However, the Rule does not preclude the court from entertain-
ing successive applications if the court so chooses.... Nor can the
Rule be read literally as authorizing the court to summarily deny
all subsequent applications merely because relief under the Rule
has been once denied. "If the allegations in the first motion were
not the same as in the pending motion, the Rule contemplates
a ruling on the merits of the second motion and a hearing thereon
when its allegations and the files and records of the case are such
to warrant it."
The Rule authorizes the court to summarily deny an applica-
tion where the issues have been determined in a prior proceeding
under the Rule. A prior adjudication upon trial and 'appeal or
upon a habeas corpus application may also be the basis for a sum-
mary denial of a 27.26 application. These rules, however, are not
premised upon the doctrine of res judicata.
In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that res judicata did not apply to judg-
ments under 28 U.S.C. 2255 (the federal equivalent of Rule
27.26). The court reasoned that the purpose of Section 2255""was
to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings by affording the same rights in another and more con-
venient forum." Since res judicata is inapplicable to habeas
corpus proceedings, it is also inapplicable to 2255 proceedings.
The common law remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis are
currently available but are restricted to their traditional scope. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Stewart v. Blair, 351 Mo. 287, 208 S.W.2d 268 (1943); City
of St. Louis v. Franklin Bank, 351 Mo. 688, 173 S.W.2d 837 (1943).
Montana
A comprehensive reform of post-conviction procedure was enacted
by Montana in 1968, with many of the features of the revised Uniform
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Act incorporated. Montana Revised Code Annotated, Chapters 26 and
27 (1947). Most important is Chapter 25, which creates a sentence
review panel of trial judges who review all cases in which the sentence
is alleged to be too severe. The panel reviews the entire record of the
trial and may in its discretion alter the sentence. A correspondent advised
that "this chapter is very favorably received by the defendants and by
many defense attorneys since it removes some of the pressure to dream
up some farfetched theory for an appeal where the real problem is that
the sentence is believed unreasonable." Letter from M. Dean Jellison,
dated October 1969.
The habeas corpus sections of the 1947 Montana Code were repealed
and replaced in 1967 by sections 95-2701 to -2716 narrowing the rem-
edy to its historical scope in recognition of the post-conviction remedy
enacted in chapter 26. Coram nobis is largely superseded by the post-
conviction remedy in chapter 26 but is still recognizable in its traditional
scope. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 139 Mont. 437, 365 P.2d 822 (1961).
Nebraska
A comprehensive post-conviction statute, incorporating the basic fea-
tures of the Uniform Act, was adopted in 1965 and revised in 1967.
Nebraska Revised Statutes, chapter 29, §§ 29-3001 et seq. (Supplement
1967). See State v. Reizenstein, 183 Neb. 376, 160 N.W.2d 208 (1968);
State v. Fitzgerald, 182 Neb. 823, 157 N.W.2d 415 (1968). It is now
used to the virtual exclusion of the statutory provisions on habeas corpus,
particularly since the state supreme court in Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb.
875, 22 N.W.2d 136 (1946) emphasized the narrow scope of habeas
corpus as a post-conviction remedy. A judge in Lincoln wrote that
two problems have manifested themselves under the new statutory pro-
cedure: There is presently no machinery for perfecting amended peti-
tions for post-conviction review, and since most such petitions are hand-
written and are inadequate in setting forth facts sufficient to grant relief,
much of the time of the trial courts is consumed in assisting informally
in amending petitions. Another problem is that counsel are not ap-
pointed where the court, upon examining the records accompanying
the petition, concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not justified. If
relief is considered justified the court may simply serve a show cause
notice on the state's attorney. Letter from Bartlett E. Boyles, November
6, 1969.
Although the post-conviction remedy lies to correct violation or in-
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fringement of a constitutional right, the writ of error coram nobis
remains valid to correct errors within the traditional scope of the writ.
See Parker v. State, 178 Neb. 1, 131 N.W.2d 678 (1964).
Nevada
The revised Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act was adopted
in 1967, Nevada Revised Statutes, §§ 177.315 to .385 (1959), with the
provision that the procedure could be instituted by writ of habeas corpus.
In Marshall v. Warden, 83 Nev. 442, 434 P.2d 437 (1967) the state
supreme court ruled that since habeas corpus was a specific constitutional
guarantee the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act habeas corpus
was essentially a supplementation of the existing writ. The result gives
the prisoner the option of proceeding by traditional habeas corpus in
the district where he is detained or by UPCPA habeas corpus in the
district where he was convicted. The primary problem resulting from
the Marshall rule was that remedies under the two habeas corpus statutes
were not coextensive and, being substantially different, were a potential
source of confusion. The difficulty engendered by the Marshall rule
appears to have been cured by the 1969 amendments to the post-con-
viction relief statutes, which excepted the writ of habeas corpus from
the exclusive remedy provision of the post-conviction relief statutes.
Nevada Revised Statutes, chapter 177, § 177.315 (1969).
New Hampshire
The basis of post-conviction relief in New Hampshire is Revised
Statutes Annotated, chapter 534, which provides for a hearing (section
534:21) and an inquiry into the sufficiency of the cause of imprison-
ment (section 534:22), with questions of fact to be raised by habeas
corpus and heard by the trial court. Other statutory provisions which
have been defined by the state supreme court as alternate forms of post-
conviction review include a motion for new trial, a petition for certiorari,
and a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty and set aside the sentence. In
all instances, the court as a matter of course will conduct a full eviden-
tiary hearing. Habeas corpus will lie to challenge material evidentiary
facts when the alleged errors of the trial court are of a constitutional
dimension. Springer v. Hungerford, 100 N.H. 503, 130 A.2d 538 (1957).
See also Allen v. Hancock, 109 N.H. 254, 248 A.2d 632 (1968); Labelle
v. State, 108 N.H. 241, 231 A.2d 480 (1967).
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New Jersey
A comprehensive revision of post-conviction procedure in New Jer-
sey was effected by the rules of court adopted September 8, 1969. These
rules provide for a series of forms which effectually guide petitioners
in the preparation of allegations which constitute a proper petition.
They also authorize the sentencing court to order relief where it is
merited on the face of the petition. Further, the rules call for a prompt
and full evidentiary hearing with a written record of findings of fact
and conclusions of law on all issues. New Jersey Supreme Court Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3:22 provides an ". . . exclusive means of chal-
lenging a judgment rendered upon conviction of a crime." Special ref-
erence should be made to the Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court's
Committee on Post-Conviction Rights of Indigents, dated October 22,
1962.
New Mexico
The post-conviction statute of 1966 is modeled upon 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A Santa Fe correspondent wrote that, "federal interpretations of that
statute will prove most persuasive here." The correspondent concludes
that a consequence of this conscious correlation between the state and
federal law is that New Mexico trial courts tend to lay "a heavy burden
of persuasion on the movant," while the appellate court appears to re-
view any case upon its merits without predisposition toward either the
state or the defense. Letter from Joseph A. Roberts, August 26, 1969.
New Mexico Statutes Annotated, chapter 41, § 41-15-8 (Supp. 1969)
is reproduced under the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure
21-1-1 (93) and amended therein to restrict the remedy to courts not
inferior to district courts. See State v. Fines, 78 N.M. 737, 437 P.2d
1006 (1968) for an interpretation of rule 21-1-1 (93).
New York
A comprehensive revision of criminal procedure is being prepared for
submission to the state legislature in 1970. Most of the commentary
received from New York has been conditioned upon these modifications.
A review of current post-conviction remedies by Professor Richard
G. Denzer of Fordham University School of Law, formerly executive
director of the temporary commission which prepared the proposed
revisions was provided by William A. Bulman, Jr. in a letter dated Oc-
tober 20, 1969:
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A. New York State Post-Judgment Remedies
In addition to the right of appeal from a judgment of convic-
tion (meamng a conviction upon wich sentence has been im-
posed), New York State provides the following post-judgment
remedies to convicted defendants:
1. Coram nobis (motion to vacate a judgmnent of conviction in
the nature of error coram nobis).
This motion, which must be made in the court of conviction,
dervies from case law (see Lyons v. Goldstein, 1943, 290 N.Y.
19) and has not been codified, although it is mentioned in pro-
visions of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with appeals
from orders denying or granting such motions (CCP §§ 517,
518 [4]).
It is a rather broad remedy accommodating a variety of conten-
tions, including clais that the judgment was procured by fraud
on the part of the prosecutor, the court or some other public
official; that perjured testimony was lmowingly used at the trial
by the prosecutor; that prejudicial error not appearing in the rec-
ord occurred at or during trial, either inside or outside the court-
room; and that the defendant was deprived of any of a number
of constitutional rights cief of which (from a utility or practical
standpoint) is the right to counsel.
An adverse determination (whether adverse to the defendant or
to the People) is appealable (CCP §§ 517, 518 [41).
2. Motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.
This motion, also made in the court of conviction, is provided
by the Code of Criminal Procedure (§§ 465 [7], 466). It labors
under a statute of limtations, the requirement being that the mo-
tion be made not more than one year after judgment (CCP § 466).
The motion requires a showing that new evidence has been dis-
covered, since the trial resulting in the judgment, which could not
have been produced by the defendant at the trial even with due
diligence on his part; which is not "cumulative" m nature; and
wich, had it been produced at the trial, "would probably have
changed the result" (§ 465 [7] ).
An order denying this motion is reviewable on an appeal from
the judgment of conviction. If the latter has already been argued
and the judgment affirmed, the order denying the motion may be
reviewed by means of a reargument of the main appeal. If the
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time for taking an appeal from the judgment has expired, no ap-
peal from the order denying the motion may be taken.
3. Motion for re-sentence.
This motion, similarly made by the defendant in the court of
conviction, has not been codified but, by judicial construction,
rests upon the inherent power of a court to correct an illegal
sentence imposed by it. Its scope, therefore, is restricted to con-
tentions of illegality and does not embrace claims of harshness or
excessiveness (People ex rel. Emanuel v. McCann, 1960, 7 N.Y.2d
342, 345; People v. Stodesocki, 1963 20 App. Div.2d 551). An
adverse determination has been held not to be appealable by the
defendant (People v. Stodesocki, supra).
4. Habeas Corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus may be used in New York, by a pris-
oner, to challenge the validity of a judgment of conviction re-
sponsible for the incarceration. It is, of course, a civil remedy,
provision therefor being made in Article 70 of the Civil Practice
Law and Rules, which prescribes the procedure both for pursuing
the remedy at nisi prius and for Appeals from orders or determina-
tions there made. The petition ordinarily must be made at a term
of the Supreme Court or a County Court located in the county
of incarceration.
The grounds for challenge cognizable on habeas corpus are said,
generally, to involve questions of "jurisdiction" over the person
and subject matter. In actuality, the scope of the remedy (at least
this phase of it) is not overly clear, and the demarcation lines
between habeas corpus and coram nobis in the post judgment area
are in some respects quite blurred. This causes much difficulty
and confusion, especially since these motions or petitions are
brought in different courts. A defendant who errs in this regard
may find that he is not only pursuing the wrong remedy, but that
he is in the wrong court.
B. Proposed Omnibus Motions
The New York Code of Criminal Procedure is in the process
of thoroughgoing revision (by a New York State Temporary
Commission), and a proposed new "Criminal Procedure Law" is
to be submitted to the Legislature for passage at the 1970 session.
This presents two "omnibus" motions in the post judgment area,
each of which must be made in the court of conviction, one being
a motion to vacate judgment (§ 440.10) and the other a "motion to
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set aside sentence" (§ 440.20). Taken together, they accommo-
date every contention cognizable upon any of the four previously
discussed existing motions or remedies; and, in addition, every
claim which may be advanced in a federal court upon a federal
habeas corpus petition attacking a New York judgment of con-
viction.
On the current practice in New York, which relies on an adaptation
of the common law writ of coram nobis, a supplementary memorandum
by Christopher Rogers, Esq., was provided by Travis H. Lewin of the
Syracuse University School of Law in a letter dated August 15, 1969:
During the 1940s, the New York Courts adapted coram nobis
to criminal proceedings in the landmark case of Lyons v. Gold-
stein, 290 N.Y.19, wherein the writ is used to correct errors prior
to judgment which resulted in a denial of due process. As a gen-
eral rule, the writ cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal nor
can it be used to challenge matters appearing on the face of the
record.
However, the grounds for coram nobis are numerous and, under
recent court decisions, constantly expanding, and reference is
hereby made to Key No. 997 of Abbott's New York Digest for
future research.
Procedurally a writ of error coram nobis will be sufficient and
a hearing will be mandated if the petition alleges facts upon which
coram nobis is available, provided that the petition also alleges some
supporting proof and the allegations are not clearly refuted by
uncontrovertible documentary evidence.
If the petitioner is successful after a hearing, the conviction will
be vacated and a new trial ordered. However, since there is no
statute of limitations governing coram nobis petitions, success of
the petitioner, as a practical matter, results in the dimissal of the
information or indictment.
This general statement is corroborated by a memorandum from the New
York County Lawyers Association, contained in a letter from Joseph
L. Maged, dated September 29, 1969, which adds this observation:
A writ of Habeas Corpus has a very limited utility in New York
with regard to post conviction remedies. The central rule has
been that it may be used to challenge a conviction by a person
in custody only where the jurisdiction of the court in which the
conviction took place is an issue. Recent statutory changes open
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the possibility of a broader use in the future, but the development
of New York law clearly has been in the direction of the use of
Coram Nobis as the principal technique for challenging convic-
tions on the basis of wrongs not appearing on the record, and that
is likely to continue. The advantage of the Coram Nobis, as dis-
tinguished from Habeas Corpus, is that Coram Nobis is heard
in the Court where the conviction took place and therefore most
conversant with the facts, whereas Habeas Corpus is returnable
where the petitioner is in custody, which is often a very different
county.
North Carolina
A recently amended post-conviction procedure act, North Carolina
General Statutes, §§ 15-217 to -22, modeled after the Illinois statute,
provides for a full evidentiary hearing with appointed counsel and a
complete record of the proceedings, where necessary. Review may be
had by certiorari to the intermediate appellate courts. For a case re-
viewing the original (1951) North Carolina post-conviction article see
Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513 (1953). Section 15-217 as
amended incorporates and supersedes all common law and statutory
remedies which were heretofore available for challenging the validity
of incarceration under sentence of death or imprisonment.
North Dakota
Effective July 1, 1969, North Dakota adopted the Revised Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. North Dakota Code Annotated, § § 29-
32-01 to -32-10 (Supp. 1969). It is anticipated that the state supreme
court will rule that this act is intended to be the exclusive means of
testing the validity of a trial or conviction; habeas corpus will return
to its pre-trial purpose of testing the jurisdiction of the court concerned.
Correspondence from Judge Adam Gefreh dated August 20, 1969, ad-
vised that it was the express intention of the legislature in enacting the
new law to provide a post-conviction remedy which would meet all
federal tests.
Ohio
The history of post-conviction practices in Ohio prior to 1965 is
outlined in Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St.2d 4, 210 N.E.2d 885 (1965).
In 1965 Ohio adopted its present statute, Page's Ohio Revised Code
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Annotated, § 2953.21 et seq. which was amended in 1967. The present
statute incorporates the essential features of the Revised Post-Conviction
Procedure Act and the basic criteria of the "trilogy." Since 1967, the
consensus of both state and federal court opinions is that the statute
does in fact preserve the safeguards advocated in federal jurisprudence.
The legislative intent in enacting the post-conviction law was to pro-
vide an alternative to the use of habeas corpus as the proper means of
testing the constitutional issue raised by state prisoners. Freeman v.
Maxwell, at 886; State ex rel. Turpin v. Court of Common Pleas, 8 Ohio
St.2d 1, 220 N.E.2d 670 (1965). In any case where the record in the
original trial is considered inadequate to determine the question (e.g.,
whether the prisoner intelligently waived a constitutional right), the
statute requires the trial court to proceed to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the question. Jones v. State, 8 Ohio St.2d 21, 222
N.E.2d 313 (1966). A reviewable claim however, must be one which
the petitioner could not reasonably have made at the original trial or on
appeal therefrom. Knox v. Maxwell, 277 F.Supp. 593 (1967). Further,
the validity of the constitutional claim under the statute is not in itself
a basis for relief unless the court determines that original denial of the
right has rendered the original judgment void or voidable. Coley v.
Alvis, 381 F.2d 870 (1967); State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226
N.E.2d 104 (1967). See also Jonesv. State, 8 Ohio St.2d 21, 222 N.E.2d
313 (1966); Comment, Ohio's Post-Conzsiction Appeal Remedy, 1
Akron Law Review 42 (1967), which criticizes the statute for being too
narrow. The comment recommends mandatory appointment of coun-
sel when a hearing is ordered, speedier resolution of the court's ruling
on the petition, elimination .of the custody requirement, and standard-
ized forms for petitioner's use.
Oklahoma
Post-conviction procedures were revised periodically between 1965
and 1969. Under the principal statute, Oklahoma Statutes Annotated,
title 22, § 1073 (Supp. 1969), appeals 6f post-conviction review are
handled by the Court Referee in the Court of Criminal Appeals who
obtains the original record of the case and evaluates it in relation to the
detailed information set out on the form provided for prisoners. Where
it is'warranted, the Court of Criminal Appeals orders a full evidentiary
hearing in the trial court, with a complete record. Post-conviction re-
view under this statute is restricted to violations of petitioner's consti-
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tutional rights relating to appeal. Zeugrin v. District Court, 419 P.2d
280 (Okla. Crim. 1966). The writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis
are available within their traditional scope.
Judge Tom Brett of Oklahoma, in a letter dated August 21, 1969,
reiterates a complaint made by several neighboring states: the prisoner
who goes into the federal court, after his relief is denied in the state
review, will offer new evidence not revealed in the state courts. The
state attorney general is seeking to persuade district courts that federal
habeas action should be bound by what was presented in the state
hearings.
Oregon
Prior to 1959, there were several post-conviction remedies available
in this jurisdiction: habeas corpus, coram nobis, motion to correct the
record, and motion to arrest the judgment. Because each of these reme-
dies had its own area of applicability and a confusion of limitations, the
state adopted the Post-Conviction Hearing Act of 1959. Oregon Re-
vised Statutes, §§ 138.510-.680. Thus, before the 1963 "trilogy" and the
revised Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1965, Oregon had
established machinery for accommodating petitioners' constitutional
questions with a full hearing including findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
Correspondents from the state stress two problems which have de-
veloped in reference to the Oregon post-conviction process. One at-
torney, who engaged in a substantial amount of criminal defense work,
points to the ease with which state prisoners can put an appeal into
operation. A printed form is available on request to the warden of
the state penitentiary; the prisoner simply fills it out and it is forwarded
to the public defender who then files it with the appropriate court
(Oregon has just created a new intermediate appellate court). "A great
percentage of the prisoners take advantage of this route since it is at
no expense to themselves." Letter from John J. Pickett, October 20,
1969.
Because of the facility with which post-conviction review can be
obtained and the complete record of the review which is required,
transfers into the federal district court are so frequent that they create
a serious problem for the public defender. Another aspect of the prob-
lem is described in a letter of September 3, 1969, from Chief Justice
William C. Perry of the Oregon Supreme Court:
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The principal complaint of the members of this court in the
field of federal and state relations is that even after a de novo
hearing in the post-conviction court, at which time the defendant
is given a full opportunity to present all the evidence which per-
tains to a denial of his constitutional rights in the trial court, the
federal courts feel free to disregard the transcript and to hold
a hearing de novo where evidence is often admitted that was never
produced and could not be passed upon by the state courts.
It seems to me that a more satisfactory relationship could be
established if the federal courts were to require that the hearing
before them be had upon the record made by the petitioner and
State in the post-conviction trial court.
Pennsylvania
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act of 1966, Pennsylvania Statutes
Annotated, title 19, § 1180-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970), was drafted with
both the "trilogy" and the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
in mind. It is further implemented by Rule 1506 of the state Rules
of Criminal Procedure, adopted in 1968, which requires a full eviden-
tiary hearing and a record of findings of fact and conclusions of law
on all points. Two memoranda from correspondents within the state
point to some of the practical difficulties involved in administration of
of the law. The first, from a Pittsburgh attorney, states:
First, as a practical matter, the form of the petition raises few
problems. Rule 1501 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure sets forth the form of petition and printed copies are readily
available in the prisons and elsewhere. Basically, the petitioner is
required to do little more than place check marks in the appro-
priate squares. Furthermore, if the petition is defective, the pe-
titioner is given ample opportunity to amend. Second, the statute
creates a rebuttable presumption that a failure to appeal a ruling
or to raise an issue is a knowing and understanding failure. A
finding of waiver is one means by which the courts can attempt
to dispose of petitions summarily. However, I am not aware that
the waiver doctrine has been or can be applied very rigorously.
See 19 Pa. Stat. Sections 1180-4.
Finally, the major problem in these cases concerns delay. It is
not uncommon for final disposition to be delayed for years, even
in cases which have potential merit.... Because of the volume,
it is not uncommon for several months to pass before a matter is
set for initial hearing. The hearing, preparation and filing of
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briefs, appeals, and postponements for reasons such as unavail-
ability of witnesses can result in unbelievable delays.
Letter from Samuel J. Reich, November 10, 1969.
The second commentary, from the Defender Association of Philadel-
phia, is even more detailed in its description of the problems encountered
in utilizing the provisions of the statute and rule of court:
Though the appointment of counsel is called for by the Act,
some of our judges at first declined to appoint counsel until the
appellate courts required that counsel be appointed to represent
the post conviction petitioners. Later cases have come down indi-
cating that where the petition is frivolous it may be summarily
dismissed without the appointment of counsel. This generally
occurs under circumstances where a prior petition has been filed
raising the same grounds and, where the petitioner was repre-
sented by counsel on that petition. The right to counsel extends
not only to the post conviction hearing, but, also to any appeals
which might be necessary from orders denying the petitions.
With respect to the petition itself, it must first be realized that
these petitions are drawn on a supplied form by the prisoners
without legal help. Our Supreme Court has specifically indicated
that these petitions should be viewed with an eye to ascertain any
real complaints which the prisoners might have without regard
to any technical deficiencies in the documents themselves. Before
dismissing a petition for failing to state a claim or alleged [sic] suf-
ficient facts, the court must give the petitioner an opportunity to
amend and remedy any deficiencies. In addition, as a matter of
practice, it is frequently sufficient to have the attorneys state on
the record, at the time the case is listed for a hearing, the specific
issues and allegations which [they] will raise and attempt to prove.
In this regard diligent counsel rarely consider themselves limited
by the allegations raised in the petitions but, view an appointment
under the Post Conviction Act as requiring them to review the
entire proceedings in an effort to raise each and every claim on
which there might be a chance of securing relief for the petitioner.
In this office we have been regarding a post conviction petition
as requiring a review de novo of the entire proceedings and have
attempted to secure a trial transcript and complete record in each
and every case. Needless to say, a substantial majority of these
.petitions are totally without merit and, indeed, in excess of fifty
per cent of them claim little more than the right to file a direct
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appeal from the entry of a plea of guilty. Even in cases such as
these we are careful to put the defendant on the stand and thor-
oughly interrogate him surrounding the circumstances of his
guilty plea in order to insure that no possible avenue of relief
is left unexplored.
The Pennsylvania Act has strict provisions regarding final liti-
gation or waiver of rights under the Act but, it has been our
experience that either the hearing courts or the appellate courts
have declined to rule an issue waived or finally litigated unless it
has in fact been specifically litigated with counsel. You Will note
that section four of our Act could allow a court to find waiver
from the mere failure to file an appeal but, I know of no case in
which any action of this sort has been taken.
The post conviction petition is initially mailed to the court by
the petitioner. Our courts have gone through a number of differ-
ent procedures which they have adopted and then discarded as
unsatisfactory. Initially, in 1966, all post conviction petitions were
referred to a "miscellaneous court" where counsel was appointed
and a hearing scheduled before the same court sometime in the
future. This system was subsequently discarded. These petitions
were preliminarily submitted to a single judge who screened them
and summarily dismissed a large number which did not meet the
requirements of the Act. This procedure was discarded when a
number of these summary dispositions were reversed for failure
to appoint counsel and for failure to grant the petitioners leave to
amend their defective petitions. Then the court adopted a pro-
cedure whereby counsel was appointed and all matters were
listed for a hearing before the trial judge, as seems to be required
by the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. This system
proved too unwieldy in Philadelphia County and broke down
completely. Early in 1969 the court again switched to the use of
a single miscellaneous room where all post conviction petitions
are heard before a single judge. Preliminarily the petitions are
sent to the trial judge who may grant summary relief such as the
right to file nuno pro tune post-trial motions and then a direct
appeal, anticipating that where a hearing can be held the de-
fendant would be granted his rights under Douglas v. California.
Similarly, the trial judge may order an amendment to the peti-
tion to state extraordinary reasons why the defendant has not
waived his right to file the petition as a result of having previously
filed a post conviction petition or, requiring a statement of facts
to support the claims in the petition. After this summary review
by the trial court, the matter is then scheduled for a hearing in
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the post conviction room, unless, for some unusual reason, the
court wishes to hear the matter itself which is occasionally done.
Counsel is then appointed at the suggestion of the trial judge
and the matter is listed for the hearing about one month in the
future.
At present, in Philadelphia County there is an enormous back-
log of many hundreds of post conviction petitions and so any
time limits, such as the twenty days which the district attorney
is given to file an answer, are generally ignored. There are also
extreme problems encountered in bringing in prisoners who are
generally in custody in the various state correctional institutions
scattered throughout the state (Pennsylvania has a "dual" system
of state correctional institutions and county prisons, with the
former holding the long-term prisoners). Many times we will
have only two or three prisoners out of a list of twenty petitions
scheduled for hearing. There are also difficulties in securing wit-
nesses who are frequently the attorneys who represented the
petitioner at his original trial. These causes contribute to a great
waste of time and delay in reaching dispositions on post convic-
tion matters.
Letter from Herman I. Polleck, September 10, 1969.
Rhode Island
The most common procedure for attacking a conviction after trial
is by a bill of exceptions to the state supreme court. If the conviction
is sustained after a hearing on the bill, a prisoner may move for a new
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence; or if he attacks the
legality of his confinement, he may seek habeas corpus with the right
to an evidentiary hearing in either the trial or appellate court. Points
of law which are not evidentiary may be attacked through the writ
of coram nobis. Although this writ is normally returnable in the trial
court, the state supreme court, according to a letter from Eugene F.
Toro dated September 12, 1969, has been "generous and lenient in its
jurisdiction," and has entertained an increasing number of these writs.
See Burke v. Langlois, - R.I. - 244 A.2d 593 (1968); Andrews v.
Langlois, 96 R.I. 461, 194 A.2d 674 (1963). In recent cases, habeas cor-
pus appears to lie in order to test constitutional issues in the absence of
a comprehensive post-conviction statutory remedy. See, e.g., Harris v.
Langlois, 100 R.I. 196, 212 A.2d 715 (1965); Moretti v. Langlois, 98 R.I.
493, 205 A.2d 19 (1964).
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South Carolina
The Revised Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act was adopted
effective May 1, 1969. South Carolina Code, §§ 17-601 to -612 (Supp.
1970). This act incorporates and supercedes all common law, statutory,
or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of
a conviction or sentence.
South Dakota
South Dakota adopted the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
in 1966, South Dakota Compiled Laws, §§ 23-52-1 to 23-52-19 (1967),
and in 1969 amended its habeas corpus statute to provide for appoint-
ment of counsel for all indigent petitioners. Habeas corpus use appears
to be superseded by South Dakota Compiled Laws, § 23-51-3, at least
for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence. A recent case
construing the post-conviction statutes is State v. Roth, - S.D. -- ,
166 N.W.2d 564 (1969).
Tennessee
The 1967 post-conviction statute, Tennessee Code Annotated, H9 40-
3801 to -3824 (Supp. 1969), closely follows the guidelines of the fed-
eral "trilogy" with emphasis on appointment of counsel and a full record
of evidentiary hearings based on an amended petition. Habeas corpus
and coram nobis are provided for by statute and lie within the traditional
narrow scope of each writ. See State ex rel. Holbrook v. Bomar, 211
Tenn. 243, 364 S.W.2d 887 (1963) (habeas corpus) and Johnson v. Rus-
sell, 218 Tenn. 443, 404 S.W.2d 371 (1966) (coram nobis). The post-
conviction statute is restricted to provide relief only for infringement or
denial of constitutional rights.
Texas
The office of the state attorney general has provided a substantial
body of professional studies. From this material, a pertinent summary
of recent post-conviction developments in Texas is quoted below. The
material appears in the 1967 edition of the Texas Peace Officers and
Magistrates Manual prepared by the Attorney General.
Post Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings (Art. 11.07, C.C.P.)
Proceedings brought under the above Article have been of much
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concern to the Federal and State District judges, the attorneys
representing the state and the State Court of Criminal Appeals,
since the great rash of Federal Writs of Habeas Corpus began a
few years ago as result of the revolutionary holding of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wain'wright, Escobedo v. Illinois,
Jackson v. Denno, et al. In fact, the Southern and Eastern Federal
Districts of Texas, where the convicts are held, were literally
swamped with applications for writs and until the judges of these
districts were allowed by the recent rule to transfer such cases
to the Federal Court nearest the county of conviction, they hardly
had time for the regular business of their courts. By a judicious
distribution of some of such cases from these districts to the West-
ern and Northern Federal districts this overload was ameliorated
to some extent, although all districts were still faced with many
time-consuming and expensive hearings on such applications. Most
of the applications were handwritten by the prisoner himself on
forms furnished to him. Some being almost illegible, almost all
presenting their issues of fact, if any, in a very disorderly fashion.
An agreement was worked out between the Attorney General's
Office, representing the Respondent, Dr. George J. Beto, Director
of the Texas Department of Corrections, and the Federal judges,
wherein service on Respondent was had by the U.S. District Clerk
forwarding copies of such applications by mail to the Attorney
General's Office for answering. This work was, and is still being,
handled by the Enforcement Division of the Attorney General's
Department. This Division, consisting of fifteen lawyers and six
secretaries, spent and spends over one-half of its working time on
the representation of the Respondent in the Federal Courts. Need-
less to say, much travel is involved, although one of such attorneys
is stationed full time in the Houston Division of the Southern Fed-
eral Judicial District. Most of these Federal District Court hearings
are adjudicated on affidavits as in many of such cases the necessary
witnesses reside outside the jurisdiction of the court, and the ob-
taining of such affidavits necessitates much labor that could be ob-
viated if the Federal District Court had a fact record that it could
adopt. In other words, the Federal judges need a full fact finding
from a state court having the jurisdiction to hear and determine
facts. A district court of the State of Texas has this power, of
course, but it should be exercised by the judge thereof making
and filing his findings of the facts and conclusions of law after
holding such hearings, and causing a narration of the facts adduced
in evidence upon such hearing, together with his findings of fact
and conclusions of law, to be transmitted by his official court re-
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porter to the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal withm
-en (10) days'of the date of such hearing. It should be noted here
that the mere certificate by the state district judge as to the cor-
rectness or identity of a narrative of facts heard by him is not
enough to satisfy the statute (Art. 11.07, Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure) as it was amended by the 60th Legislature this year, unless
it is accompanied by the judge's findings of facts and conclusions
of'talw based upon such evidence. Also it is the duty of the dis-
trict clerk to transrmt a transcript of all pleadings filed in the hear-
irig to the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals withim thirty
(30) days. These time limits for the filing of such narration of
facts or the transcript may be extended by the Court of Criminal
Appeals for good cause shown. The ten (10) day time limit set
by the 1967 amendment for the preparation and filing of the nar-
ration of facts seems much too short in most instances but it is not
thought that there will be any trouble in getting extensions in such
cases.
The only new portions of said Art. 11.07, C.C.P., added by the
60th Leg. is the wording of that part providing a hearing in the
convictnig state court on any petition for writ of habeas corpus
presented therein containing sworn allegations of fact, which, if
true, would render petitioner's confinement under the felony
conviction illegal, and it appearing that there are unresolved mate-
nal issues of fact thereby presented, together with the provision
directing the judge conducting such hearing to make and file his
findings of fact and conclusions of law and return same with a
narration of facts and transcript to the Court of Criminal Appeals
within said times and for such action thereon as is therein specified.
This new portion is not thought to invoke any radical change
in the operation of the proceedings under such Article from those
drigmally encompassed by it. It is thought that the prime purpose
of such amendment was to spell out the action to be taken by the
judge conducting the hearing, in regard to us duties to resolve the
material issues of fact involved, as distinguished from a mere
certification that such and such a fact was adduced before lun.
Also it gave statutory authority for the Court of Crinmal Appeals
to adopt such findings.
In any event, U.S. District Judge Leo Brewster of the Northern
,District of Texas, "broke the ice" by his holdings in the cases of
Hams v. Beta (Jan. 7, 1967), Castillo v. Beto (March 10, 1967),
and Carroll v. Beto (May 3, 1967), to the effect that an application
for writ of habeas corpus filed originally in the Texas Court of
Crimal Appeals by a convicted felon is not exhaustive of the.
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post-conviction remedies available under Texas law. Judge Brew-
ster points out that however valuable such original filing procedure
in the Court of Criminal Appeals may be for receiving a deter-
mination of legal questions shown on the record of applications
so filed in said Court, it is virtually ineffective in providing the
type of fact-finding hearing promulgated in Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, (1963), but, he says, in effect, that the procedure in
Art. 11.07, C.C.P., (even as it stood before amendment by the
60th Leg. this year) is principally designed to afford a hearing to
ascertain facts and resolve questions of constitutional deprivations
containing factual issues arising in Texas trial courts; that such
relators have a post-conviction remedy available in the Texas
Courts and the fact-finding procedure in that remedy is adequate
to afford them full and fair hearings of the sort mentioned in
Townsend v. Sain, therefore in not presenting such issues to the
trial court for a factual determination as to their truth or falsity
they have failed to exhaust their state remedies and are not en-
tided to plenary hearings in the Federal District Court. The Car-
roll case was duly appealed by Applicant Carroll to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and on June 22, 1967, Judge
Brewster's order denying the writ was affirmed in a per curiarn
opinion, giving the specific reason therefor that Applicant had
failed to present his contentions to the Texas Courts in a state
habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to Article 11.07, Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1965. In response to this holding, the other
Federal District Judges began dismissing applications pending be-
fore them wherein it appeared that Applicant or Relator had not
obtained such factual hearings under said Art. 11.07, C.C.P. Mean-
while, the 60th Legislature of Texas amended said Article as here-
in before explained. Since such time the state district judges have
been called upon by many convict-applicants for such hearings.
Also some have been petitioned by such convicts, without a pend-
ing application for writ of habeas corpus, for the furnishing to
them of a record of their trials.
See Ex Parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. 1967) for a thorough
discussion of the scope and procedure of the post-conviction remedy
afforded by Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (habeas
corpus).
Utah
The state supreme court on August 20, 1969, made effective an
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amendment to Supreme Court Rules of Civil Procedure 65B (f) broad-
ening the use of habeas corpus as a test of the validity of a sentence, and
Rule 65B (i) substantially incorporating the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act. See Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968
(1968) regarding the scope of habeas corpus prior to amended Rule
65B (f). Coram nobis is available in its traditional scope. Sullivan v.
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 448 P.2d 907 (1968).
Vermont
A 1966 statute, Vermont Statues Annotated, title 13, §§ 7131-37
(Supp. 1969), incorporates into state law most of the basic features
of the Uniform Act. Habeas corpus is applicable to test questions in-
volving fundamental constitutional rights, In re Norse, 125 Vt. 460, 218
A.2d 456 (1966), but petitioners must make a post-conviction motion
before habeas corpus petitions will be entertained. Vermont Statutes
Annotated, tide 13, § 7136 (Supp. 1969).
Coram nobis is available in Vermont, Petition of Garceau, 124 Vt.
220, 202 A.2d 266 (1964), but it will likely be treated in a fashion
similar to habeas corpus..
Virginia
Virginia has no comprehensive post-conviction relief statute, and
the statutory procedure governing habeas corpus is the only practical
means of testing allegations of denial of defendants' rights. Virginia
Code Annotated, § 8-485 (1958) relates to motions to correct any errors
in the record on which conviction is based. Essentially, this provision
has been interpreted as replacing the common law writ of error coram
nobis.
As in most jurisdictions, habeas corpus is a civil rather than a criminal
proceeding. Accordingly, it is a new action rather than a continuation
of the original action. In this sense habeas corpus does offer an inde-
pendent means for reviewing the record in a criminal case for the spe-
fic purpose of determining the petitioner's allegations of denial of rights.
From the viewpoint of the standards set out in the "trilogy" the pri-
mary flaw in the Virginia procedure is the absence of a mandatory
provision for an evidentiary hearing by the sentencing court. The
theory is that if the allegations are based upon a record already in ex-
istence, the habeas court can review on the basis of this record, or, at
its discretion, it can reserve the granting of a hearing. The writ of
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habeas corpus in Virginia does not appear to extend beyond its tradi-
tional scope of jurisdictional inquiry. See Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va.
318, 321, 171 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1969) wherein it was said that "[t]he
function of a writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into jurisdictional
defects amounting to want of legal authority for detention of a person
on whose behalf it is asked. The court in which a writ is sought exam-
ines only the power and authority of the court to act, not the correct-
ness of its conclusions ..... " Cf. Smyth v. Midgett, 199 Va. 727, 101
S.E.2d 573 (1958).
A Richmond attorney, Maurice H. Bell, in a letter dated September
16, 1969, stresses the difficulty of getting into the federal court on a 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas action, because the statute appears to require
exhaustion of state remedies in terms of the sentence imposed. Formerly,
the state supreme court held that if the sentence was not being served,
a collateral attack upon it could not be made. Since 1967, the Supreme
Court of Appeals has ruled otherwise in view of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968). Prospective sentences which are not being served are permitted
to be attacked. During the time when the conflict existed, however,
the district courts in Virginia were obliged to follow the ruling of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Martin v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 349 F.2d 781 '(1965).
Washington
The writ of habeas corpus is used extensively in the State of Wash-
ington as the only available post-conviction remedy other than direct
appeal. There is a conflict of opinion as to its adequacy in this respect,
but it does appear that its traditional scope has been considerably broad-
ened. See In re McNear, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 398 P.2d 732 (1965) for
comment on the present scope and procedures in determining denial
of due process of law where fundemental constitutional rights are in
issue. Habeas corpus applications may be filed in forma pauperis, with
provision for a transcript, in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and
the Superior Court (trial court) in the county in which the applicant
is confined.
West Virginia
The Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act was enacted and made
immediately effective on January 25, 1967. It provided a post-conviction
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
remedy incorporating and superseding all common law and statutory
remedies heretofore collaterally available for challenging the validity
of a conviction or sentence. West Virginia Code, § 53-4A-1 (c) (Supp.
i970). Federal court authority testifies to the adequacy of this compre-
hensive post-conviction remedy. Kidd v. Coiner, 299 F. Supp. 1380
(N.D. W. Va. 1969). See also Sheftic v. Boles, 377 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.
1967).
Wisconsin
A general revision of post-conviction procedure modeled after 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) was under consideration in the state legislature
late in 1969, but no word has been received concerning its disposition.
Until such time as new statutory provisions are operative, habeas corpus
under Wisconsin Statutes § § 292.01 and .02 provide the standard means
of attacking a conviction. In State v. Kanieski, 30 Wisc. 2d 573 , 141
N.W.2d 196, 198 (1966), the court observed that beyond the traditional
use of the writ to test jurisdiction, "we have enlarged the scope and
purpose of that writ to review violations of substantial constitutional
rights.... ." Cf. Fairchild, Post-Conviction Rights and Remedies in Wis-
consin, 1965 Wisconsin Law Review 52.
Wyoming
A state post-conviction procedure act, modeled after the 1955 Uni-
.form Post-Conviction Procedure Act, was adopted in 1961, and very
recently the state has promulgated a new set of criminal procedure
rules modeled after those of the federal courts. Taken together, the
statute and the new rules appear to insure full evidentiary hearings where
the record accompanying the petition for post-conviction review does
not permit granting or denial of the relief. See Wbitley v. State, 293
F. Supp. 381 (D. Wyo. 1968). Cf. Raper, Post-Conviction Remedies,
19 Wyoming Law Journal 213 (1965).
V. APPLICATION OF THE "SCALE OF ADEQUACY"
From the summary of individual state procedures in Part IV of this
study it is possible to suggest a means of evaluating the present status
of the post-conviction remedies in the several states in terms of the fac-
tors set out in the "scale of adequacy" defined in Part III. Table 3 meas-
ures the specific provisions in the statutes or court rules of each state
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against the criteria in the Revised Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act of 1965.
In constructing this table, the following jurisdictional differences have
been taken into account: (1) in many states either common law action
coram nobis or petition for habeas corpus is still the only relief available;
(2) in other states the situation is the same, except that the common law
process has been incorporated into a statute or a court rule; (3) in a
few states a special form of habeas corpus has been adapted by statute
to the specific purposes of post-conviction relief; (4) in a few states the
Uniform Act has been adopted in haec verba; and (5) in a few states
the statute goes substantially beyond the model act.
In Part III. 3. supra, the several sections of the Uniform Post-Convic-
tion Procedure Act of 1965 were annotated with cross-references to
selected statutes or court rules appearing in Table 3 which follows.
Reference to the text of these statutes or rules will suggest the specific
provisions which conform to the "scale of adequacy" which both federal
and state courts are seeking.
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TABLE
POST-CONVICrION REMEDIES PROVIDED IN COMMON
Uniform Post-Conviction
State Habeas Corpus Coram
Nobis
Remedy Defined Saving Clause Procedure
ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§ 1-43 (1958)
ALAS. STAT. tit. 12, § 12.75.010-
12.75.230 (1962)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-2001 to
-2027 (1956)
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1701 to
-1746 (1947)
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473
(West 1970)
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 65-1-1 to
-1-21 (1963)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 52-466 to -470 (1960)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 6901-6918 (1953)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 79.01-.12
(1964)
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 50, §§ 50-
101 to -127 (1933)
HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 660,
§§ 660-1 to -33 (1968)
IDAHO CODE § 19-4201 et seq.
(1948)
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.65, §§ 1-39
(1959)
IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-1901 to
-1925 (1968)
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 663.1 -.40
(1950)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1501 to
-1507 (1964)
KY. REV. STAT. ch. 419, §§ 419.
020-.130 (1 970)
C/L
C/L
C/L; tit.
9, ch. 4,
§ 1265
C/L
C/L
§§ 9-3302,
3303, 3306,
3307 (1968)
C/L
C/L
RULE 35(c)
RULE 1 (B)
S. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 35(b)
S. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 1 (A)
RULE 35(b)
SUPER. CT.
CRIM. R. 35(2)
S. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 1.850
tit. 50, § 50-127(1)
§ 194901 (a)
ch. 38, § 122-1
S. CT. R. P. C.
1, § 1(a)
RULE 35(d)
RULE 1(A), (B),
(C)
RULE 35(b)
RULE 35 (a)
RULE 1.850
tit. 50, § 50-127(4)
§ 194902
ch. 38, § 122-5
RULE PC 1,
§2
§ 60-1507(b);
RULE 121 (f)
RULE 11.42(4),
(5), (6)
RULE 35 (a)
§ 19-4901 (b)
RULE PC 1,
§ 1 (b)
S. CT. R. 121(c)
S. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 11.42(1)
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RULE 35(e)
RULE 1 (A)
tit. 50, § 50-
127(2)
§ 19-4903
ch.38, § 122-
2
RULE PC 1,
§3
RULE 121
(e)
RULE 11.42-(2),(3)
RULE 35 (f)
RULE 1 (D)
§ 19-4904
ch. 38, § 122-
4
RULE PC 1,§ 2 and 9(2)
RULE 121
(e), (f)
RULE 11.42-
(4),(5)
RULE 35 (i)
RULE 1 (H)
tit. 50, § 50-
127(1)
§ 19-4908
ch. 38, § 122-
3
RULE PC 1,
§8
RULE 35 (g)
RULE 1 (E)
RULE 35 (h)
RULE 1 (E)
RULE 35(b)
RULE 35 (a)
RULE 35 (j)
RULE 1 (F)
RULE 35 (b)
RULE 1.850
tit. 50, § 50-
127(11); tit.
6, § 6-701
§ 19-4909
ch. 38, § 122-
7
RULE PC 1,
§7
§ 60-1507(d)
RULE 11.42-
(7)
RULE 35(g) (2)
RULE 1 (C)
RULE 1.850
tit.,50, § 50-127
(10)
RULE PC 1,
§6
§ 60-1507(c);
RULE 121 (d)
tit. 50, § 50-127 tit. 50,
(6) 127(6)
§ 19-4906
ch. 38, § 122-5
RULE PC 1,
§4
RULE 11.42(5)
§ 50-
§ 19-4907
ch. 38, § 122-
6
RULE PC 1,
§5
§ 60-1507(b);
RULE 121 (h)
RULE 11.42-
(5),(6)
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TABLE 3
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES PROVIDED IN COMMON
Uniform Post-Conviction
State Habeas Corpus Coram
Nobis
Remedy Defined Saving Clause Procedure
LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN.
art. 351 et seq. (West 1967)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§§ 5501-5546 (1965)
MD. CODE ANN. art. 42, §§ 1-28
(1957)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
250, §§ 1 et seq. (1959)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 600.4301-.4379 (1968)
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 589.01 et
seq. (1947)
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 2815-40
(1942)
MO. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.010 et
seq. (1949)
MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 95-2601 to -2608 (1947)
NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 29, § 29-
2801 et seq. (1943)
NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 34,
§§ 34.360-.680 (1957)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 534,
§§ 534:1-:32 (1955)
N.J. STAT ANN. tit. 2A, §§ 2A:
67-1 et seq. (1952)
N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 22,
§§ 22-11-1 et seq. (1953)
N.Y. CPL & R, art. 70, §§ 7001-
12 (McKinney 1963)
N.C. GEN, STAT. §§ 17-1 et seq.
(1965)
N.D. CODE ANN. tit. 32, § 32-
22-01 et seq. (1960)
C/L
C/L
§ 1992.5
C/L
C/L
C/L
C/L
tit. 14, § 5502
art. 27, § 645A (2)
S. CT. R. 27.26
§ 95-2601
ch. 29, § 29-3001
ch. 177, § 177.
315(1)
S. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 3.22
ch. 41, § 41-15-8
§ 15-217
tit. 29, § 29-32-01
(1)
tit. 14, § 5502
art. 27, § 645A(e)
§ 590.01
RULE 27.26 (a),
(b)
ch. 177, § 177.
315(2)
RULE 3:22-3
§ 15-217
tit. 29, § 29-32-01
(2)
tit. 14, §§ 5503,
5505
§ 590.01
RULE 27.26
§ 95-2602
ch. 29, § 29-3001
ch. 177, § 177.
325
RULE 3:22-1;
RULE 3:22-7
ch. 41, § 41-15-8-B
§ 15-217.1
tit.29, § 29-32-03
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tit. 14, § 5504
S. CT. R.BK41
§ 590.01
RULE 27.26-
(c)
§ 95-2603
oh. 177,§ 177.335
RULE 3:22-8
§ 15-218
tit. 29, § 29-
32-04
tit. 14, § 5506
RULE BK42
§ 590.01(2);
§ 590.05
RULE 27.26-(h), (k), (1)
ch. 29, § 29-
3004
ch. 177,
§ 177.345 (1),
(2),(3)
RULE 3:22-
6-(a)-(d)
ch. 41, § 41-
15-8-B
§ 15-219
tit. 29, § 29-
32-05
tit. 14, § 5505
RULE BK 43
§ 590.03
§ 95-2605
ch. 177, § 177.
325
RULE 3:22-9
§ 15-220
tit. 29, § 29-
32-06
tit. 14, § 5505
RULE BK44
§ 590.04
RULE 27.26-
(e)
§ 95-2605
ch. 29, § 29-
3001
ch. 177,
§ 177.365
RULE 3:22-
10
ch. 41, § 41-
15-8-B
§ 15-221
tit. 29, § 29-
32-07
tit. 14, § 5507
art. 27, § 645
A(c); RULE
BK 48
ch. 177,
§ 177.365
RULE 3:22-4
tit. 29, § 29-
32-08
tit. 14,
RULE
§ 5507
BK 48
tit. 14, § 5505,§ 5508
RULE BK46,
BK 47
§ 590.06
RULE 27.26-
(i)
§ 95-2608
ch. 29, § 29-
3002
ch. 177,
§ 177.385
RULE 3:22-11
ch. 41, § 41-
15-8-E
§ 15-222
tit. 29, § 29-
32-09
§ 590.04
RULE 27.26(d,
§ 95-2607
ch. 29, § 29-
3003
ch. 177, § 177.
375
RULE 3:22-4
and 3:22-5
ch. 41, § 41-15-
8-D
tit. 29, § 29-32-
06(2)
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Uniform Post-Conviction
State Habeas Corpus Coram
Nobis
Remedy Defined Saving Clause Procedure
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 27,
§§ 2725.01 et seq. (Page 1953)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 1331-1355 (1961)
ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 34.-
310-.730 (1968)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1871-
1907 (1967)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-9-1 to
-9-32 (1956)
S.C. CODE § 17-601 (2) (Supp.
1970)
S.D. COMP. LAWS tit. 21, §§ 21-
27-1 to -27-29 (1967)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1801
to -1839 (1955)
TEX. STAT. ANN. (C. CRIM.
P.) arts. 11.01-.64 (1966)
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 78; Civil
P. R. 65B(f) (1953)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3951-
3985 (1958)
VA. CODE tit. 8, §§ 8-596 to -609
(1950)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 7.36.010-.36.250 (1961)
W.VA. CODE ch. 53, §§ 53-4-1 to
-4-13 (1966)
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 292.01-.46
(1958)
WYO. STAT. tit. 1, §§ 1-810 to
-855 (1957)
C/L
C/L
§ 40-3411
C/L
C/L
C/L
§ 958.07
(1958)
tit. 29, § 2953.
21 (A)
tit. 22, § 1073
ch. 138, § 138.530
tit. 19, §§ 1180-2;
1180-3
tit. 17, § 17-601(a)
tit. 23, § 23-52-1
§ 40-3805
S. CT. R. C. P.
65 B (f); 65B (i) (1)
tit. 13, § 7131
ch. 53, § 53-4A-1
tit. 7, § 7-408.1
ch. 138, § 138.
540(1) and (2)
tit. 19, § 1180-2
tit. 17, § 17-601(b)
tit. 23, § 23-52-2
ch. 53, § 53-4A-1
(e)
I
tit. 29, § 2953.
21(B), (C)
CT. CRIM. APP.
R. 25
ch. 138, § 138.560
tit. 19, § 1180-5;
S. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 1506
tit. 17, § 17-603
tit. 23, § 23-52-5;
§ 23-52-6
§ 40-3803; § 40-
3806
RULE 65B(i) (1)
tit. 13, § 7133
ch. 53, § 53-4A-3
tit.7, § 7-408.1
1970] FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 233
-CONTINUED
LAw, STATE STATUTES AND COURT RuLEs-Continued
Procedure Act or Equivalent
Denial of
Petitions Indigency Pleadings Hearings Waiver Appeals Petition
tit. 29, § 2953.
21(D)
ch. 138, § 138.
610
tit. 19, § 1180-8
tit. 17, § 17-606
(a)
tit. 23, § 23-
52-9
§ 40-3814
RULE 65B(i)
(6)
tit. 29,
§ 2953.21 (A)
ch. 138,
§ 138.580
tit. 19,
§ 1180-5
tit. 17,§ 17-604
tit. 23, § 23-
52-7
§ 40-3804
RULE 65B-
(i) (2)
tit. 13, § 7132
ch. 53, § 53-
4A-2
tit. 7, § 7-
408.2
tit. 7, § 7-408.5
tit. 29,
§ 2953.22tit. 29,§ 2953.24
tit. 22, § 1074
ch. 138,
§ 138.590
tit. 19,
§ 1180-12
tit. 17,§ 17-605
tit. 23, § 23-
52-8
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